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CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The following are the constitutional and statutory provisions which are addressed in 
this appeal: 
§30-3-5, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
I. Did the Court abuse its discretion by finding Merlin's family cabin to be 
entirely marital property? The appellant court will not disturb the trial court decision 
concerning property divisions unless it is clearly unjust or a clear abuse of discretion. 
Walters v. Walters. 812 P.2d 64, 66 (Utah App. 1991) cert, denied 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 
1993). 
II. Did the Court abuse its discretion by failing to apportion to Merlin his 
premarital interest in the cabin and award it to Merlin as separate property? The appellant 
court will not disturb the trial court decision concerning property divisions unless it is clearly 
unjust or a clear abuse of discretion. Walters v. Walters. 812 P.2d 64, 66 (Utah App. 1991) 
cert denied S36 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1993). 
III. Did the Court abuse its discretion by failing to charge the marital estate and 
divide equally the costs of the appraisals used by the Court in determining property 
values? The standard of review of the apportionment of costs is whether the trial court 
abused its discretion. Lloyd's Unlimited v. Nature's Way Marketing. Ltd.. 753 P.2d 507, 
512 (Utah App. 1988). 
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IV. Did the Court abuse its discretion in denying post trial motions to take 
additional evidence on the monies received from the sale of the St. George 
condominium? The denial of post trial motions is reviewed under the abuse of discretion 
standard. Katz v. Peirce. 732 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 1986). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
1. Louise filed her complaint for divorce on December 22, 1997. R. 1. 
2. Louise immediately sought a Temporary Restraining Order and Order to 
Show Cause. R. 10. 
3. Both parties engaged in discovery in preparation for trial. 
4. A bench trial was held on October 8 and 9, 1998. R. 101. 
5. The Court issued a Memorandum Decision on October 20, 1998. R. 101-
108. 
6. Various post trial motions were filed including a Motion to Assess Costs 
(R. 109) and a Motion to Reconsider Court's Ruling and/or Reopen Trial to Take 
Additional Testimony and Evidence. 
7. On or about February 13, 1999, the Court entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and a Decree of Divorce. R. 132-149. 
B. FACTUAL HISTORY 
1. The parties were married on October 21, 1969. TT. Vol. I, p. 1. 
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2. The parties separated on November 6, 1997. R.l 
3. The parties had no children together but each had children from a prior 
marriage. R. 1-8. 
4. Prior to the marriage, Merlin was the record title owner of property at Bear 
Lake on which he and his sons had constructed a cabin. TT. Vol. I, p. 43 L. 5-8. 
5. The cabin remained in Merlin's name throughout the course of this 
marriage and was regarded by he and his children by a prior marriage as a family owned 
cabin. TT. Vol. I, p. 198, L. 20-23. 
6. During the marriage, Merlin's adult sons began constructing an addition to 
the cabin while Merlin was working in California. TT. Vol. II, p. 362 L. 20-21. 
7. Merlin helped work on the cabin on weekends when he was in town but his 
sons did most of the work. TT. Vol II, P. 362. 
8. The addition increased the size of the cabin by one bedroom for each of his 
two sons, one bedroom for Merlin and a garage. TT. Vol. I, p. 43, L. 18-19. 
9. The materials for the addition were paid for mostly by the two sons with 
Merlin contributing approximately $5,000.00 in cash. 
10. Many of the materials used were scavenged and therefore the actual costs 
of the material were minimal. Id_ 
11. The value of the cabin at the time of the divorce was $119,000.00. 
$50,000.00 for the land, $40,000.00 for the original A-Frame Cabin, and $29,000.00 for 
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the addition. TT. Vol. I, p. 120, L. 1, TT. Vol. I, p.124, L.9-11 and TT. Vol. I p. 125 L. 
19-21. 
12. The appraised value of the cabin was not challenged at the trial court and 
no other evidence of the present value of the cabin or improvements was introduced. 
See Record generally. 
13. The parties also owned a residence in Layton, Utah. TT. Vol. I, p. 132. 
14. The Layton home was purchased during the marriage. Id. 
15. The mortgage payments on the Layton home were made from marital 
resources until approximately one year prior to the parties separation and divorce when 
Merlin received a worker's compensation settlement which was used to pay off the 
mortgage balance of $30,661.08. R. 135-138. 
16. At trial the Court found the entire value of the addition to be marital and 
"negative extrapolitated" sua sponte without evidence the value of the cabin at the time 
of the marriage. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court abused its discretion by finding the value supplied by the two sons 
in improving the cabin to be marital and by "negative extrapolating" a premarital value 
without supporting evidence. The trial court should have awarded the entire cabin 
property to Merlin as premarital property or at least segregated his contribution to the 
value of the improvements and divided that as part of the marital estate. The trial court 
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abused its discretion by failing to charge the marital estate with the costs of the appraisals 
used by the Court in determining property values. The Court abused its discretion in 
denying post trial motions to take additional evidence on the disposition of monies 
received from the sale of the St. George condominium. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY FINDING 
THE APPRECIATION IN THE VALUE OF THE BEAR LAKE 
CABIN TO BE PART OF THE MARITAL ESTATE. 
The trial court abused its discretion in finding the appreciation in Merlin's 
premarital family cabin to be marital property. The standard of review is that on appeal 
the decision of the lower court will not be disturbed concerning property divisions unless 
it is clearly unjust or a clear abuse of discretion. Walters v. Walters. 812 P.2d 64, 66 
(Utah App. 1991) cert, denied 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1993). Because the portion of the 
trial court's decision with respect to the cabin is an abuse of discretion, this Court must 
reverse that portion of the decision. 
The trial Court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on February 
13,1999. R. 132-144. Finding of Fact No. 11, states the following: 
II . One of the central issues in this case is whether certain property is marital or 
non-marital and the valuation of such property. During the marriage, the parties 
have maintained individual bank accounts. Some of the property has been titled in 
both names and some in respondent's name only or in conjunction with third 
parties. The court concludes that all income of each party whether in a joint 
account or in separate accounts is marital property and should be accounted for as 
such. Moreover, the same is true for property titled in one or both parties' names 
7 
and in property held in conjunction with third parties as the interests of the parties 
may occur. On the other hand, property brought into the marriage unless the 
exceptions cited in MORTENSEN v. MORTENSEN, 760 P.2d 304, 308 (Utah 
1988) apply. Following are the Court's findings as to valuation and status of the 
marital estate: 
A. Bear Lake Cabin with adjacent Lot: The respondent owned an A-
Frame cabin and 50 foot water front adjacent lot on the west shore of Bear 
Lake at the time of the parties marriage. The lot was sold for $5,000.00 in 
1971 to J. Gordon and Virjean Reynolds when the parties moved to Florida 
for respondent's work. It was allegedly repurchased by respondent's four 
children in 1974 for $20,000.00 although a deed was not signed by the 
Reynolds until April 18, 1980 and not recorded until September 18, 1997. 
The lot is considered to have a current value of $50,000.00. Improvements 
have been made to the lot including fill dirt, sprinkler system, sod and 
retaining wall. Most of the labor and costs were borne by respondent's 
children and some by respondent. Petitioner made no contribution to the 
adjacent lot. Therefore, the Court finds that the lot is non-marital property. 
On the other hand, the cabin, which also has a 50 foot water front 
frontage, has been in the name of the respondent since the marriage. 
Moreover, the cabin has been significantly enlarged and remodeled. It has 
been insured under both parties's name. Taxes and most of the cost 
associated with the improvements have been paid from marital funds. The 
remodel has been done by respondent with the aid of his two sons as quid 
pro quo for respondent's assistance with their improvements of the adjacent 
lot. Over the years, petitioner has taken care of the domestic chores 
associated with the cabin and its lot while respondent has handled the 
physical improvements and financial matters associated with the cabin. 
The entire family has used both the cabin and adjacent lot for recreational 
purposes. Household furnishings in the cabin have been contributed to by 
both petitioner and respondent from premarital property. The court 
therefore concludes that petitioner has contributed to the enhancement, 
maintenance, and protection of the cabin and its associated lot throughout 
the 28 years of the marriage and thus it is marital property. 
The court further concludes that the current value of the cabin is 
$119,000.00. However, the amount should be decreased by its value at the 
time of the marriage. Petitioner suggests that its original value should be 
based on the valuation by the county for property tax purposes which is 
$1,900.00. The court rejects this notion. Respondent argues that the value 
at the time of the parties marriage is irrelevant. The Court also rejects this 
argument. If the adjacent lot, which is the same size as the cabin lot was 
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worth $5,000.00 when initially sold and is now worth $50,000.00, then by 
negative extrapolation, the cabin and its lot which is now worth 
$119,000.00 would have been valued at approximately $12,000.00 at the 
time of the parties marriage. And the Court so concludes. Therefore, the 
marital property value of the cabin and its lot is $119,000.00 less 
$12,000.00 of [sic] $107,000.00. 
B. Residence: The residence is located in Layton, Utah was purchased 
during the marriage and has a current value of $141,000.00. There is no 
mortgage outstanding. The home is marital property although respondent 
argues that he should receive a $30,661.00 credit against the home 
representing moneys he paid to the mortgagee when the mortgage was paid 
off. He claims the source of those funds came from a lump sum payment 
for permanent partial impairment resulting from the industrial accident 
heretofore referred to. Those funds are non-marital property to which 
respondent is entitled leaving a balance of $110,339.00 as marital property. 
R. 135-138. 
The Court included the division of property in its conclusions of law wherein the 
Court awarded to Merlin the Bear Lake Cabin and the marital residence to Louise. R. 
141-142. Any adjustment for the personal injury non-marital portion of Merlin's interest 
in the marital residence was somehow accounted for in the Court's alimony award. R. 
142. 
The trial court committed an abuse of discretion by finding that the Bear Lake 
Cabin was mostly marital property. As noted in the Finding of Fact above, the trial court 
found that the property was owned by Merlin prior to the parties marriage, that title was 
held only in his name throughout the marriage and then ignored the only competent 
expert testimony presented at the trial that the value of the improvements done to the 
cabin was $29,000.00, only $5,000.00 of which had been paid for by Merlin, the balance 
having been paid for by his two sons. R. 135-136. Despite, the court specifically finding 
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that all premarital property should be awarded to the party who brought it into the 
marriage the Court ignored the evidence and invented an approach it referred to as 
"negative extrapolation" to arrive at a premarital value. This novel approach is 
inconsistent with the evidence and is an abuse of the trial court's discretion. 
In Mortensen. the Court laid out exceptions to the general rule that separate 
property, together with the appreciation thereof, should be awarded to the party who 
brought the property into the marriage. Specifically, the Court in Mortensen, stated that 
separate property may be considered marital property if "the other spouse has contributed 
to the augmentation, improvement, or operation of the property or has significantly cared 
for, protected or preserved it." Id^ at 306. Merlin believes that Louise's conduct does 
not rise to the level of the exceptions set forth in Mortensen as a matter of law and 
therefore the court abused its discretion. 
Louise testified that she kept a few items of her personal property at the cabin at 
Bear Lake and that some of her premarital property was used to furnish the cabin. Trial 
Transcript, Vol. 1, 26 L. 5-8. Louise testified that Merlin owned the Bear Lake property 
prior to the parties marriage. TT. Vol. I, p. 43, L. 5-8. Louise testified that at the 
beginning of the marriage the cabin property was two separate lots upon one of which 
was the A-Frame Cabin. TT. Vol. I, p. 43, L. 12-13. Louise testified that an addition was 
made to the cabin after the parties marriage. TT. Vol. I, p. 43, L. 18-19. Louise testified 
that she did not know how the addition was paid for. TT. Vol. I, p. 47, L. 7-9. Louise 
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thereafter contradicted herself by stating that while she did not know where the money 
came from she was sure it was marital. TT. Vol. I, p. 47, Line 10-12. Counsel for 
Merlin objected to Louise counsel's attempt to rehabilitate her testimony by asking 
leading questions on this point and also that she was attempting to impeach her prior 
testimony that Louise did not know where the money came from which objection was 
sustained. TT. Vol. I, p. 47, L. 13-17. Louise testified that the utility bills and taxes for 
the cabin were paid out of household money. TT. Vol. I, p. 47, L. 18-24. Louise 
testified that Merlin paid for some improvements to the cabin. TT. Vol. I, p. 49, L. 19-
21. The cabin was titled throughout the marriage in the name of Merlin and LaVonne 
Symes, with LaVonne being Merlin's first wife. TT. Vol. I, p. 53, L. 3-5. Louise 
testified that during the marriage when the parties went to the cabin she cooked the 
meals, washed the dishes, cleaned, weeded, planted flowers. TT. Vol. I, p. 56, Line 5-11. 
On cross examination, Louise testified that she had not been to the cabin since 
1996. TT. Vol. I, p. 163, L. 1-2. Louise testified that title to the cabin and lot had never 
been in her name. TT. Vol. I, p. 198, L. 20-23. Louise did not know where the money 
came from to repurchase the lot at Bear Lake which had been earlier sold. TT. Vol. I, p. 
205, L. 9-11. 
In contrast to Louise testimony about her alleged contributions to the Cabin and 
Lot, Merlin testified that the cost of the addition to the cabin was borne largely by his 
adult sons. TT. Vol. II, p. 362, L. 20-21. Merlin testified that Louise never showed any 
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interest in the Bear Lake property. TT. Vol. II, p. 363, L. 19-21. Merlin testified that 
most of the improvements to the cabin were done by the boys using salvage materials and 
that he contributed not more than $5,000.00 including the carpeting. TT. Vol. II, page 
408, L.5-19. The real estate appraiser testified that the present market value of all of the 
improvements provided by Merlin and his two sons was $29,000.00. TT. Vol. I, page 
124, L.9-11. 
Merlin believes that the trial court abused its discretion by determining that any 
portion of the Bear Lake Property was marital. It is a standard rule of construction that 
words are to be given their plain meaning. In the present case, Louise's own testimony is 
that she did nothing to augment the value of the property other than to lend some of her 
premarital property to furnishing the cabin (which she received back in the distribution of 
personal property) and the performance of routine chores while visiting the property. 
Louise did not make any improvements to the property nor did she contribute to the 
operation of the property. Louise did not significantly care for the property. She did not 
protect the property nor did she preserve the property. Rather, when Louise and the 
family used the property, she cooked and cleaned for them and did some chores which 
were related to the care of the people but not involved in the improvement of the 
property. This is not legally sufficient to meet the standard set forth in Mortensen. As 
such, the Court erred in determining that any portion of the Bear Lake Cabin and Lot 
were marital property. The Bear Lake Cabin and Lot should be awarded to Merlin, free 
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and clear of any interest in Louise. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY FAILING TO 
APPORTION TO MERLIN THE PREMARITAL VALUE OF THE 
CABIN AND THE APPRECIATION THEREOF. 
The trial court abused its discretion by failing to apportion to Merlin his premarital 
interest in the cabin and awarding it to Merlin as separate property. The appellant court 
will not disturb the trial court decision concerning property divisions unless it is clearly 
unjust or a clear abuse of discretion. Walters v. Walters, 812 P.2d 64, 66 (Utah App. 
1991) cert, denied 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1993). Because the decision is an abuse of 
discretion, this Court should reverse the lower court's decision. 
Willard Peterson, a real estate appraiser specializing in appraisals of property 
surrounding Bear Lake testified as to the value of the property including the cabin. Mr. 
Peterson testified that he performed an appraisal and the value of the property and cabin 
and that the value of the property was $119,000.00. TT. Vol. I, p. 120, Line 1. Mr. 
Peterson stated that the addition to the cabin constructed by Merlin and his sons added 
very little additional value to the cabin because it was not professionally done. TT. Vol. 
I, p. 120, L. 14-17. Mr. Peterson stated that the value of the addition was $29,000.00. 
TT. Vol. I, p. 124, L. 9-11. Mr. Peterson testified that the A-Frame Cabin had a present 
value of $40,000.00. TT. Vol. I, p. 124, L. 6-8. Mr. Peterson testified that the Lot had a 
present value of $50,000.00. TT. Vol. I,, p. 125, L. 19-21. Mr. Peterson testified that he 
was paid $275.00 to perform the appraisal. TT Vol. I, p. 122, L. 15. Merlin properly 
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maintains that the A-Frame Cabin, and the Lot are his separate property, were never 
marital in nature or commingled assets and that he should have been awarded them free 
and clear of any interest in Louise. Merlin contributed $5,000.00 towards the 
improvements done to the cabin during the marriage the total of which were valued 
altogether at $29,000.00. The adult sons contributed most of the labor and materials to 
build the addition and regarded this as their ownership interest. The Court ignored the 
contributions of the two sons and found that their contributions were somehow a quid 
pro quo for their interest in the second adjoining lot even though there was no evidence 
to that effect presented at trial and the children testified that they purchased the lot 
without any assistance from Merlin. 
It is the rule of law in this state that premarital property, together with the 
appreciation thereof, should normally be awarded to the party who brought that property 
into the marriage. See Mortensen: See Also Burke v. Burke, 733 P. 2d 133, 135 (Utah 
1987): Naranjo v. Naranjo, 751 P.2d 1144, 1147 (Utah App. 1988): Watson v. Watson, 
837 P.2d 1, 5 (Utah App. 1992); Walters v. Walters, 812 P.2d 64, 67 (Utah App. 1991); 
and Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314, 1320 (Utah App. 1990). As stated above, Merlin 
does not believe that the exceptions to this Rule apply as previously argued. 
The Court did in fact provide Merlin with some credit for the premarital value of 
the property. However, this value did not include any appreciation on that premarital 
interest. Specifically, the Court awarded to Merlin a premarital interest in the property in 
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the amount of $12,000.00. The balance of the value was considered marital property. 
This is a clear abuse of discretion. See cases cited in previous paragraph. There was 
specific testimony from Willard Peterson who stated the aggregate value of the property 
was $119,000.00. Further, Mr. Peterson stated that the value of the improvement to the 
Cabin was $29,000.00. Therefore, all of the balance of the value of the Bear Lake Cabin 
and Lot was premarital value and appreciation thereon, in the amount of $90,000.00. It 
was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to award a value greater than Merlin's share 
of the contributions to the $29,000.00 addition as marital property. 
In light of the Court's error in its treatment of the Bear Lake Cabin and Lot, it was 
additional error to award Louise the marital residence in Layton. Louise testified that the 
value of the marital residence was $141,000.00 TT V. I, p. 41, L. 13. Derek Lamb, a 
professional real estate appraiser valued the Layton residence at $141,500.00. TT. Vol. I, 
p. 132, L. 2. Specifically, the Court found that the Layton residence was valued at 
$141,000.00. The Court found that Merlin made a separate property contribution of 
$30,661.00 which was subtracted from the value. The Court found that Merlin failed to 
account for the proceeds of the sale of a condominium in St. George and included the 
unexplained money as a marital asset subject to division even though Merlin testified that 
he spent all the money supporting Louise and had no money left. The Court thereafter 
found a value for the Layton residence at the appraised value less Merlin's separate 
property plus Louise's portion of the proceeds of the condominium sale at $120,674.00. 
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This asset was awarded to Louise to offset the award of the Bear Lake Cabin and Lot to 
Merlin. Merlin's position is that only the value of his contribution to the improvement of 
the cabin should be marital. Assuming that the actual marital value of the Bear Lake 
Property was 1/3 of the $29,000.00 improvements (which is larger than the $5,000.00 
Merlin testified was his actual contribution), the Court should have awarded Louise one 
half of that amount, or only $4,833.33 as her interest in the cabin. Merlin's one half 
interest in the value of the Layton residence was $60,337.00. Louise's interest in the 
Bear Lake Cabin should have been offset against Merlin's interest in the Layton property 
leaving Merlin a lien against the Layton residence in the amount of $55,503.00. It was a 
clear abuse of discretion to do otherwise. The Court should reverse that decision and 
award Merlin a lien on the residence of that amount in addition to the cabin as his 
separate property. 
Alternatively, this Court should adopt a formula for addressing the division of real 
property in all divorce cases in which there are separate property interests. This concept 
was set forth in Judge Michael D. Lyon's article in the Utah Bar Journal, entitled, The 
Source of Funds Rule-Equitably Classifying Separate and Marital Property, which set 
forth a formula approach to the division of both marital and non-marital assets based on 
the treatise by Brett R. Turner, entitled Equitable Distribution of Property. Judge Lyon's 
article (a copy of which is attached) sets forth an easily followed explanation of this 
theory, is well reasoned, and equitable. Pursuant to the theory, called the "Source of 
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Funds Rule" the initial steps are to determine how and when the property was acquired, 
give credit for contributions made at the time of acquisition from separate property and 
throughout the marriage from both separate and marital property and allow appreciation 
to be accrued on all contributions until you arrive at the present value. 
Under the source of funds rule, property may be separate, marital or mixed. For 
instance, in the present case, the property is both marital and mixed because of the lump 
sum contribution made to the Lay ton residence and Merlin's premarital ownership of the 
Bear Lake Cabin and Lot. Under this rule, uniform, easy to follow formula's are used to 
determine: 1) value or net equity (separate contributions + marital contributions + 
appreciation); 2) marital interest [present value(marital contributions/total 
contributions)]; 3) separate interest [present value(separate contributions/total 
contributions)]; 4) separate contributions (FMV at time of marriage -mortgage at time of 
marriage); and 5) marital contributions (mortgage at time of marriage -mortgage at time 
of divorce). Using these simple formulas the trial court can plug in numbers which are 
available to it at trial to effectuate a consistent equitable result in all divorce cases and 
eliminate the need for the court to "negative extrapolate". This approach is consistent 
with all of the principles of equitable distribution which have been adopted by this Court 
in the past and would provide a more uniform standard for trial judges and trial counsel 
to apply in the future. It is similar in approach to the Woodward formula adopted by the 
Court to divide retirement and pension benefits and would provide the same type of 
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overall benefit and direction to the judiciary. 
Applying the above stated formulas to the numbers in the present case would 
reach an equitable result which would recognize Merlin's separate property and the 
appreciation thereon as his property as well as fairly divide the parties marital 
contributions and the appreciation thereon equally. Merlin urges this Court to adopt the 
set of formulas set forth in the Source of Funds Rules as a method of standardizing the 
achievement of equitable distribution of separate and mixed property in this state and to 
remand to the trial court this case with instructions to do so. Doing so will provide a 
greater degree of certainty for both trial counsel and the bench and a more uniform 
application of the law throughout the State. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY FAILING TO 
DIVIDE THE COSTS OF VALUING PROPERTY BETWEEN THE 
PARTIES. 
The trial court abused its discretion by failing to charge the marital estate and 
divide the costs of the appraisals used by the Court in determining property values. The 
standard of review of the apportionment of costs is whether the trial court abused its 
discretion. Lloyd's Unlimited v. Nature's Way Marketing, Ltd.. 753 P.2d 507, 512 (Utah 
App. 1988). Because the trial court abused its discretion, this Court should reverse that 
portion of the decision. 
Merlin believes the trial court erred in ordering him to shoulder all of the burden 
associated with the costs of the appraisals which were relied upon by the Court in 
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determining values for certain property. It is undisputed that the trial court has the 
discretion to award costs in divorce proceedings. Merlin recognizes that pursuant to 
current Utah case law, appraisal and accounting fees which are incurred in preparation 
for a divorce trial are not necessarily taxed as costs. Morgan v. Morgan,795 P.2d 684 
(Utah App. 1990). However, Merlin believes that in instances such as the present case, 
where the Court accepts the appraised value as evidence, it is the only evidence used to 
fix value, and the Court then divides equally the entire marital estate. It is inequitable that 
one party should bear the entire responsibility for producing that appraisal. Dividing 
equally that cost is consistent with the Courts equal division of all assets and would 
promote equitable distribution rather than requiring one party to bear all of the costs. 
The Court made no special findings on why it forced Merlin to bear all of these costs 
while at the same time purporting to equalize everything else. It was error to do so. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING 
POST TRIAL MOTIONS FOR THE TAKING OF ADDITIONAL 
EVIDENCE. 
The court abused its discretion in denying post trial motions to take additional 
evidence on the monies received from the sale of the St. George condominium and the 
value of the cabin at the time of the marriage. The denial of post trial motions is 
reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. Katz v. Peirce, 732 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 
1986). Merlin filed a motion for reconsideration or alternatively to reopen the divorce 
proceeding to take additional evidence. This Motion was denied by the trial court. 
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Merlin believes it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny his motion when 
said motion was timely filed and revealed to the Court the fact that additional evidence 
which was material to the Court's proper determination of the issues was available, could 
not have been presented at trial, and could materially affect the Court's ruling. This is 
especially true where the motion for reconsideration was filed before the entry of a final 
decree of divorce in this proceeding. The gravamen of Merlin's position is that nothing 
in the pre-trial discovery or pleadings could have alerted him or his attorney to the fact 
that money received and spent two years prior to the parties' separation would be an 
issue at trial and redistributed absent proof that it was spent for marital purposes. The 
Court should have recognized this from the pleadings and the pre-trial order and allowed 
Merlin an opportunity to present evidence he could not have anticipated would be needed 
at trial, especially where the records needed to do so were wholly in the control of the 
Petitioner since the parties separation and were not made available to Merlin prior to 
trial. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court abused its discretion in its decision that the cabin and lot at Bear 
Lake were marital property. Even assuming that it was in part marital property, it was an 
abuse of discretion for the trial court to fail to award to Merlin the reasonable premarital 
value of such property together with the appreciation thereon. This Court should adopt 
the source of funds rule as a formulaic method of dealing with real property values in the 
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context of a divorce proceeding. The trial court abused its discretion by denying Merlin's 
post trial motion for reconsideration or alternatively to reopen the trial for additional 
evidence. This Court should reverse the decision of the trial court. 
Dated and Signed this / 7 day of A(J6l/ST , 1999. 
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Attorney for Appellant 
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APPENDIX 
UT ST § 30-3-5, Disposition of property-Maintenance and health care of parties and 
children-Division of debts-Court to have continuing jurisdiction-Custody and 
visitation-Determination of alimony-Nonmeritorious petition for modification 
Pagel 
Utah Code § 30-3-5 
WEST'S UTAH CODE 
TITLE 30. HUSBAND AND WIFE 
CHAPTER 3. DIVORCE 
(Information regarding effective dates, 
repeals, etc. is provided subsequently in 
this document.) 
Current through End of 1998 General Sess. 
§ 30-3-5. Disposition of property-
Maintenance and health care of parties 
and children-Division of debts-Court 
to have continuing jurisdiction-
Custody and visitation-Determination 
of alimony-Nonmeritorious petition for 
modification 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the 
court may include in it equitable orders relating to 
the children, property, debts or obligations, and 
parties. The court shall include the following in 
every decree of divorce: 
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the 
payment of reasonable and necessary medical and 
dental expenses of the dependent children; 
(b) if coverage is or becomes available at a 
reasonable cost, an order requiring the purchase 
and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, 
and dental care insurance for the dependent 
children; 
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5: 
(i) an order specifying which party is 
responsible for the payment of joint debts, 
obligations, or liabilities of the parties contracted 
or incurred during marriage; 
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify 
respective creditors or obligees, regarding the 
court's division of debts, obligations, or liabilities 
and regarding the parties' separate, current 
addresses; and 
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these 
orders; and 
(d) provisions for income withholding in 
accordance with Title 62A, Chapter 11, Recovery 
Services. 
(2) The court may include, in an order 
determining child support, an order assigning 
financial responsibility for all or a portion of child 
care expenses incurred on behalf of the dependent 
children, necessitated by the employment or 
training of the custodial parent. If the court 
determines that the circumstances are appropriate 
and that the dependent children would be 
adequately cared for, it may include an order 
allowing the noncustodial parent to provide child 
care for the dependent children, necessitated by 
the employment or training of the custodial 
parent. 
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to 
make subsequent changes or new orders for the 
custody of the children and their support, 
maintenance, health, and dental care, and for 
distribution of the property and obligations for 
debts as is reasonable and necessary. 
*8559 (4)(a) In determining visitation rights of 
parents, grandparents, and other members of the 
immediate family, the court shall consider the best 
interest of the child. 
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the 
need for peace officer enforcement, the court may 
include in an order establishing a visitation 
schedule a provision, among other things, 
authorizing any peace officer to enforce a court 
ordered visitation schedule entered under this 
chapter. 
(5) If a petition for modification of child custody 
or visitation provisions of a court order is made 
and denied, the court shall order the petitioner to 
pay the reasonable attorneys' fees expended by the 
prevailing party in that action, if the court 
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determines that the petition was without merit and 
not asserted or defended against in good faith. 
(6) If a petition alleges substantial 
noncompliance with a visitation order by a parent, 
a grandparent, or other member of the immediate 
family pursuant to Section 78-32-12.2 where a 
visitation right has been previously granted by the 
court, the court may award to the prevailing party 
costs, including actual attorney fees and court 
costs incurred by the prevailing party because of 
the other party's failure to provide or exercise 
court-ordered visitation. 
(7)(a) The court shall consider at least the 
following factors in determining alimony: 
(i) the financial condition and needs of the 
recipient spouse; 
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to 
produce income; 
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide 
support; and 
(iv) the length of the marriage. 
(b) The court may consider the fault of the 
parties in determining alimony. 
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to 
the standard of living, existing at the time of 
separation, in determining alimony in accordance 
with Subsection (a). However, the court shall 
consider all relevant facts and equitable principles 
and may, in its discretion, base alimony on the 
standard of living that existed at the time of trial. 
In marriages of short duration, when no children 
have been conceived or born during the marriage, 
the court may consider the standard of living that 
existed at the time of the marriage. 
(d) The court may, under appropriate 
circumstances, attempt to equalize the parties' 
respective standards of living. 
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves 
on the threshold of a major change in the income 
of one of the spouses due to the collective efforts 
of both, that change shall be considered in 
dividing the marital property and in determining 
the amount of alimony. If one spouse's earning 
capacity has been greatly enhanced through the 
efforts of both spouses during the marriage, the 
court may make a compensating adjustment in 
dividing the marital property and awarding 
alimony. 
*8560 (f) In determining alimony when a 
marriage of short duration dissolves, and no 
children have been conceived or born during the 
marriage, the court may consider restoring each 
party to the condition which existed at the time of 
the marriage. 
(g)(i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to 
make substantive changes and new orders 
regarding alimony based on a substantial material 
change in circumstances not foreseeable at the 
time of the divorce. 
(ii) The court may not modify alimony or issue a 
new order for alimony to address needs of the 
recipient that did not exist at the time the decree 
was entered, unless the court finds extenuating 
circumstances that justify that action. 
(iii) In determining alimony, the income of any 
subsequent spouse of the payor may not be 
considered, except as provided in this subsection. 
(A) The court may consider the subsequent 
spouse's financial ability to share living expenses. 
(B) The court may consider the income of a 
subsequent spouse if the court finds that the 
payor's improper conduct justifies that 
consideration. 
(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration 
longer than the number of years that the marriage 
existed unless, at any time prior to termination of 
alimony, the court finds extenuating 
circumstances that justify the payment of alimony 
for a longer period of time. 
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(8) Unless a decree of divorce specifically 
provides otherwise, any order of the court that a 
party pay alimony to a former spouse 
automatically terminates upon the remarriage of 
that former spouse. However, if the remarriage is 
annulled and found to be void ab initio, payment 
of alimony shall resume if the party paying 
alimony is made a party to the action of 
annulment and his rights are determined. 
(9) Any order of the court that a party pay 
alimony to a former spouse terminates upon 
establishment by the party paying alimony that the 
former spouse is cohabitating with another 
person. 
Amended by Laws 1994, c. 284; Laws 1995, c. 330, § 1, eff. 
May 1, 1995; Laws 1997, c. 232, § 4, eff July 1, 1997. 
HISTORICAL NOTES 
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
Section 2 of Laws 1995, c. 330 provides: 
"It is not the intent of the Legislature that termination of 
alimony based on cohabitation with another person in 
accordance with Subsection 30-3-5(9), be interpreted in any 
way to condone such a relationship for any purpose." 
Search this disc for cases citing this section. 
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Views from the Bench 
The Source of Funds Rule - Equitably Classifying 
Separate and Marital Property 
byJudgp Michael D. Lyon 
JVXost district court judges and family law lawyers have han-
dled a case similar to the following example: Wife has a house 
with a mortgage when the parties are married; the title stays in 
her name and the parties pay on the mortgage with marital 
funds. How, then, at the time of the divorce is the equity or value 
in the house divided? More specifically, how is Wife's separate 
interest protected while assuring that the marital contribution to 
the value of the home is respected? The salient objective of this 
article is to share with the bar and bench the source of funds 
rule, a tool which provides an equitable and systematic method 
of classifying separate and marital property.' 
1. UTAH LAW ON THE CLASSIFICATION OF PROPERTY 
The analysis of a property division incident to a divorce begins 
with section 30-3-5 of the Utah Code, which ostensibly gives a 
trial court broad power to equitably divide all property owned 
by the parties, regardless of when or how it was acquired: 
"When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include 
in it equitable orders relating to the children, property, debts or 
obligations, and partes." U.CX § 30-3-5 (1997). Indeed, 
facially it creates an ail property system namely, that all prop-
erty owned by the parties may be equitably apportioned 
between them, regardless of ownership or whenever acquired. 
Historically, the Utah Supreme Coun was reluctant to go beyond 
the broad language of the statute and provide hard and fast 
rules for property division, holding instead that a grant of broad 
discretion to the trial coun would better ensure an equitable 
result. Consequently; the Utah high court found no abuse of 
discretion when premarital property, or separate gifts and 
inheritance, were liberally divided between the divorcing par-
tes.SeeNewmeyerv. fiewmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1987); 
BusbeU v. Busbell, 649 P2d 85 (Utah 1982); Dubois v. 
Dubois, 504 R2d 1380 (1973). likewise, it affirmed trial 
courts on the other end of the spectrum who concluded that 
each party should, in general, receive the real and personal 
property he or she brought into the marriage. See Preston v. 
Preston, 646 P.2d 705 (Utah 1982); Georgedes v. Georgettes, 
627 P.2d 44 (Utah 1981) Jesperson v.Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326 
(Utah 1980); Humphreys v. Humphreys, 520 R2d 193 (Utah 
1974). 
In the past decade our appellate courts have recognized the 
value of adopting and consistently applying some general rules 
and have created an analytical framework for the treatment and 
division of separate and marital property. In Mortensen v. 
Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304 (Utah 1988), Justice Howe articulated 
what has become the general rule in the division of separate or 
inherited property. 
[Tlrial courts making "equitable" property division 
pursuant to section 30-3-5 should, in accordance with 
the rule prevailing in most other jurisdictions and with 
the division made in many of our own cases, generally 
award property acquired by one spouse by gift and inher-
itance during the marriage (or property acquired in 
exchange thereof) to that spouse, together with any 
appreciation or enhancement of its value, unless (1) the 
Judge Michael D. Lyon was appointed to 
the Second District Court in July 1992 by 
Governor Norman H. Bangerter. He 
serves as chair of the Board of District 
Judges and be recently served as presid-
ing judgp of the Second District Court. 
He is a member and past president of 
RexE. lee American Inn of Court. Prior 
to his judicial appointment, he practiced in general litigation 
with the law Jim of Lyon, Helgesen, Waterfall & Jones in 
Ogden, Utah Judge Lyon receivedhisB.S. degree, cum laude, 
from Weber State College and bisJD, degree from the Univer-
sity of Utah College of law in 197L His is married and the 
father of six children. 
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other spouse has by his or her efforts or expense con-
tributed to the enhancement, maintenance, or protection 
of thai property, thereby acquiring an equitable interest in 
it, or (2> the property has been consumed or its identity 
lost through commingling or exchanges or where the 
acquiring spouse has made a gift of an interest therein to 
the other spouse. 
Id at 308 (citations omitted). 
Mortensen is a seminal decision because it not only provides a 
more definite statement upon which practitioners and trial 
courts can rely, it shifts the analysis in Utah from an all property 
system to a modified dual classification system, where prop-
erty is first categorized as either separate or marital and then, 
presumptively; die separate property is given to the owner 
spouse and the marital property is divided equitably. The pre-
sumption thai separate property is given to the owner spouse 
may be rebutted, however, if there are just and equitable rea-
sons to do otherwise. Thus, the dual classification system that is 
absolute in some states is a modified system in Utah because 
equity might require the trial court to 
invade separate property in fashioning 
an equitable result 
Since Mortensen, apparently in the 
interest of promoting more predictabil-
ity and encouraging more consistent results, the Utah Court of 
Appeals has restricted a trial court's ability to divide separate 
property between the parties to situaUons involving "extraordi-
nary circumstances;' Burt v. Burt, 799 R2d 1166 (Utah App. 
1990), or 'linique circumstances," Walters v. Walters, 812 P.2d 
64 (Utah App. 1991). The court of appeals has been more 
proactive in monitoring the trial court's divisions, emphasizing 
that property division should be done in a "fair, systematic 
fashion." Hall a Hall, 858P.2d 1018 (Utah App. 1993). Specifi-
cally, the court of appeals requires detailed findings as to the 
classification of property before it is divided. See Haumont v. 
Haumont, 793 R2d 421 (Utah App. 1990) (remanded for 
findings as to die source of the disputed properties); Rappteye 
v. Rappleye, 855 P.2d 260 (Utah App. 1993) (similar result); 
Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166 (Utah App. 1990) (similar result). 
Thus, it is critical for trial courts and lawyers representing 
divorcing litigants to be conversant with a consistent approach 
for classifying and dividing separate property. 
"Classification of property as 
either separate or marital must 
focus on when and how the 
property was acquired." 
2. THE SOURCE OF FUNDS RULE 
A. Importance of Equitable Classification 
This current emphasis on property classification highlights a 
hole in Utah case law. Although Utah law is now fairly dear as to 
the analysis a trial court and litigants must follow once property 
has been classified, there have not been any Utah cases that 
have clearly defined bow to determine if an asset is marital or 
separate property. The source of funds rule therefore fits 
cleanly and logically into the backdrop of existing Utah law 
because it is purely a rule of classification that provides a defini-
tion of marital property. Indeed, as discussed in more detail 
below, although Utah has not formally adopted the source of 
funds as a method of classification, many Utah cases apply 
source of funds principles. I recommend to the reader Brett R 
Turner's treatise, Equitable Distribution of Property, from 
which came many of the ideas and formulas used in this article. 
Classification of property as either separate or marital must 
focus on when and how the property was acquired The theory 
of the source of funds rule begins with die premise that prop-
erty is acquired by the parties when its 
real economic value is created For 
example, a party may hold legal tide to a 
house upon purchase, but will actually 
only "acquire" equity in the property as 
the mortgage is reduced or paid off. 
Thus, in the opening example, although Wife holds tide to the 
house upon marriage, if die actual value of the home is created 
during the marriage through marital mortgage payments, the 
source of hinds rule would define the home as marital property 
because its value was acquired during the marriage. 
The above example also illustrates that die acquisition of an 
asset may be a continuing process of making payments for the 
acquired property and, at die time of the divorce, there may be 
both a separate and a marital component in the value of the 
property. (This example is not to be confused with a situation 
where a separate asset has been commingled with marital assets 
or has been gifted to the marital estate such that die asset has 
lost its separate classification. When a separate asset is com-
mingled, it should be classified as marital property and divided 
between the parties. Mortensen, 760 E2d at 308.) Consider 
these further details to the above example: Wife owns a house 
with a fair market value of $ 100,000 at the time of the marriage 
and at that time die house carries an $80,000 mortgage. The 
house remains in her separate name and the parties use marital 
funds to pay down the mortgage. At the time of die divorce, the 
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fair market value is still $100,000 but the mortgage is now 
$60,000. A trial court using the source of funds approach 
would classify $20,000 of the $40,000 of acquired value in the 
home as separate property and the remaining $20,000 as mart-
ttl property. 
Obviously, a practitioner or a trial judge will rarely be faced 
with dividing property that has not either appreciated or depre-
dated in value. Typically, the trial judge and the litigants are 
faced with the difficult proposition of classifying appreciation 
caused by forces outside the parties' control, such as inflation 
or market forces* I have found in several cases J have decided, 
that it is in these situations thai the source of funds rule and 
accompanying formulas are most helpful. The source of funds 
rule dictates that this kind of appreciation bfc given the same 
character as the underlying asset Accordingly, if the asset has 
been acquired by separate funds, all of the appreciation is 
separate, likewise, if the asset has been acquired with separate 
and marital funds, which is the typical situation, the apprecia-
tion is allocated between the marital 
and separate estates proportionally. 
Brett R. TUrner, Equitable Distribution 
of Property 163 (2d ed. 1994). Giving 
appreciation the same classification as 
the asset that produced the appreciation 
is supported by a line of Utah cases. See 
Mortensen, 760 P.2d at 308 (holding 
that separate property should be awarded to the owner spouse 
together with any appreciation or enhancement of its value"); 
Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314 (Utah App. 1990)(affirming 
award to plaintiff of retirement benefits accumulated prior to 
marriage, together with all interest attributable to those premar-
ital contributions); Preston u. Preston, 646 P.2d 705 (Utah 
1982) (remanding to the trial court for an award to defendant 
of separate property together with the proportion of apprecia-
tion in value attributable thereto). 
Although allocating appreciation proportionally may force 
members of the bar and bench from their comfort zones to 
perform mathematical exercises, 1 believe failure to award a 
litigant who has separate funds in an asset a proportionate 
share of the appreciation of the asset is not only inequitable, but 
constitutes plain error. When a separate interest in property is 
simply returned at the end of a marriage without any attribut-
able interest, the property has inequitably been used as an 
interest-free loan. Absent compelling equitable reasons to the 
contrary, no one could argue persuasively that this approach 
should be adopted, and yet litigants routinely bypass a more 
complicated analysis by simply backing out the separate inter-
est, giving it to the owner spouse, and then dividing die 
remaining property equally. 
The facts and outcome olHaUv. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah 
App. 1993)) Illustrate the inequities of this routine approach. In 
Hall, the trial court found that the wife had contributed $21,000 
into a marital home, and so it divided the equity in the home 
equally and then took $21,000 out of the husband's marital 
share and gave it to the wife. The court of appeals held thai, in 
order for an allocation of property to be done in "a fair, system-
atic fashion;1 the trial court should first classify property as 
separate or marital, then award the wife her separate contribu-
tion (absent "extraordinary circumstances"), and then divide 
the marital equity in the home equally between the parties. 
Following these instructions, if the trial court found no extraor-
dinary circumstances on remand, the wife's initial investment of 
$21,000 was returned to her without a proportionate share of 
When a separate interest in *e tot€rest Hcr m>m invesunenl m 
property is simply returned at 
the end ofa marriage without 
any attributable interest, the 
property has inequitably been 
used as an interest-free loan." 
the home was therefore treated as an 
interest-free loan to the marriage. Mr. 
TUrner, in commenting on ditHall case, 
points out that had the value of the 
home dropped, it would clearly have 
been improper for the court to reim-
burse petitioner for her separate 
contributions, leaving the marital estate to bear the entire loss. 
"If the separate estate must share the loss, however, it is only 
fair to allow it to share the gain. When marital and separate 
contributions are made to a single asset, the respective marital 
and separate interests should be treated as percentages and not 
as absolute amounts." Turner, supra, at 388, app. A. 
I believe that given the court of appeals' preference for a sys-
tematic, fair approach, had the wife objected to the trial court's 
failure to provide more than mere reimbursement of the sepa-
rate investment, the court of appeals would have approved 
awarding the wife a proportionate share of the interest How-
ever, since the parties did not raise the amount of 
reimbursement on appeal, the court of appeals appropriately 
did not address the issue. Clearly, then, to ensure that a spouse's 
separate property is fully and equitably restored with a propor-
tionate share of the interest, it is essential for practitioners and 
trial court judges to understand and consistently apply the 
sometimes difficult source of funds formulas.2 
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B. Hie Source of Funds Formulas 
As stated above, when a property's appreciation is caused by 
forces outside the parties' control, such as inflation or market 
forces, the appreciation should be given the same classification 
as the underlying property. If, therefore, the parties have con-
tributed to the property $10,000 in separate funds and $20,000 
in marital funds, the appreciation should be classified propor-
tionally, or one-third as separate and two-thirds as marital. In 
Mr. Turner's mathematical formulas, this translates as follows: 
Value (or net equity) = separate contributions + marital 
contributions + appreciation 
Marital interest« value(marital contributions/total 
contributions) 
Separate interest = value(separate contributions/total 
contributions) 
Application of the formula is clearer through use of our exam-
ple, with additional details: Wife owns a house with a fair 
market value of $ 100,000 at the time of the marriage and at the 
time of the marriage the house carries an $80,000 mortgage. 
The bouse remains in her separate name and the parties use 
marital funds to pay down the mortgage. At the time of the 
divorce, the fair market value has increased to $160,000, due to 
market forces, and the mortgage is now $40,000. The numbers 
would plug into the formulas as follows: 
Value (or net equity) * separate contributions + marital 
contributions + appreciation 
separate contributions = FMV at marriage - mortgage 
at marriage 
= $100,000 - $80,000 * $20,000 
marital contributions = Mortgage at marriage -
mortgage at divorce 
= $80,000 - $40,000 * $40,000 
Value « $20,000 + $40,000 + $60,000 = $120,000 in 
net equity 
separate interest = value(sep. contribution/total 
contribution) 
separate interest = $120,000($20,000/$60,000) 
= $40,000 
marital interest = value(mar. contribution/total 
contribution) 
marital interest = $120,000($40,00Q/$60,000) 
= $80,000 
Therefore, under the source of funds rule, the $ 120,000 of 
equity is classified $40,000 as Wife's separate interest and 
$80,000 as marital interest. Wife would therefore be entitled, 
absent extraordinary circumstances, to $80,000 in equity 
($40,000 separate interest plus one-half of the marital interest). 
She receives back her separate contribution of $20,000 plus the 
portion of appreciation that is attributable thereto; she receives 
a return on her investment. Typically, if the court determines a 
division of property should be consistent with this classification, 
the home is either sold or awarded to the owner spouse, who 
also assumes responsibility for the mortgage payments and 
must pay her former spouse his equity. In our example, Wife 
would receive the home, worth $160,000, assume payments on 
the $40,000 mortgage, and be forced to buy out Husband's 
$40,000 of equity. Thus, even though she is awarded the home, 
she receives no more than her share of the equity. 
The above example assumes all of the appreciation on the home 
is a result of market forces or inflation. When, however, appre-
ciation results from specific contributions of marital funds or 
efforts, die resulting appreciation assumes the character of the 
funds or efforts. TUrner, supra, at 162. This classification of 
appreciation from capital improvements is in accordance with 
Utah case law that when a spouse has by his or her efforts and 
expense contributed to the enhancement, maintenance, or 
protection of the property, he or she has acquired an equitable 
interest in xlMortensen, 760 P.2d at 308. 
To illustrate how a court could classify appreciation that may be 
in part due to capital improvements, assume this final variation 
of my example: Wife owns a house with a fair market value of 
$100,000 and an $80,000 mortgage at the time of the marriage. 
The house remains in her separate name, and the parties pay 
down the mortgage using marital funds and, using $20,000 of 
marital funds, finish off the basement At the time of die divorce, 
the box market value of the house has increased to $ 160,000 
and die mortgage Is $40,000.1 believe that the most equitable 
approach is to add the value of the marital funds expended on 
the home, or $20,000, to the amount of marital contributions 
and the amount of total contributions, as shown below: 
Value (or net equity) « separate contributions + marital 
contributions + appreciation 
separate contributions » FMV at marriage - mortgage 
at marriage 
= $100,000 - $80,000 = $20,000 
marital contributions « [Mortgage at marriage - mort-
gage at divorce] + marital funds 
spent on capital improvements 
= ($80,000 - $40,0001 • $20,000 
= $60,000 
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Value « $20,000 + $60,000 + $40,000 = $120,000 in 
net equity 
separate interest = value(sep. contribution/total 
contribution) 
separate interest = $120,000($20t000/$80,000) 
= $30,000 
marital interest = value(mar. contribution/total 
contribution) 
marital interest - $120,000($60;000/$80J000) 
= $90,000 
Therefore Wife would be entitled (absent extraordinary equi-
table circumstances) to $30,000 as a separate interest in the 
home and the $90,000 marital interest would be divided equally 
between the parties.5 It should be noted that there may be times 
when evidence is presented as to the amount of appreciation 
directly resulting from the improvement. When a trial court is 
presented with this kind of evidence, it seems equitable thai the 
appreciation resulting directly from die capital improvement be 
backed out of the total appreciation and classified as marital. 
The remaining appreciation should then be apportioned 
between the separate and marital contributions using the for-
mulas and, because the appreciation due to the capital 
improvement has already been allocated, the marital funds 
spent on the capital improvement should not be included in 
either the numerator (marital contributions) or the denomina-
tor (total contributions) of the working fractions. 
C. Evidence 
As is illustrated by Hall, appellate courts cannot rule on the 
appropriateness of allocating appreciation proportionally 
through the source of funds rule without detailed findings from 
the trial court judge. Similarly a trial court cannot properly 
apply the source of funds formulas if the litigants do not present 
detailed evidence as to the value of the property. To ensure 
litigants do provide the necessary data, I use a pretrial order, 
specifically advising the parties that the allocation of separate 
property seems to be at issue, and that the parties should be 
prepared to present evidence as to the following: 
1. The home's Eur market value and mortgage amount at the 
rime of the trial; 
2. The amount of the parties' marital contribution to the 
equity (or die amount the parties have paid on die mort-
gage during the marriage and, separately, any capital 
contributions); and 
3. The amount of the premarital equity interest in die home.4 
3. CONCLUSION 
David S. Dolowitz, in the April 1998 edition of the (/tab Bar 
Journal, criticizes the appellate courts for, among other things, 
being inconsistent and sometime inequitable in their treatment 
of appreciation on separate property. David S. Dolowitz, The 
Conundrum of Gifted, Inherited and Premarital Property in 
Divorce, 11 Utah B.J. 3 at 16 (1998). His comments may well 
indicate die growing level of frustration among members of die 
bar who are left widiout definite, equitable guidance in this area. 
I have found the source of funds rule to be practical in its direc-
tion as to the classification of separate and marital property, and 
equitable in its result. By focusing the inquiry narrowly on die 
value of the property and when that property was acquired and 
by providing formulas that may be consistently applied, its 
adoption would help eliminate some of the apparent frustration 
among members of die bench and bar by providing clear direc-
tion, tiiereby fostering more negotiated setdements and 
ensuring more uniform, equitable trial court decisions. Mem-
bets of die bench and bar should move beyond occasional 
application of source of funds principles to wholesale adoption 
of the source of funds rule. Mr, Turner notes that," le] quitable 
distribution decisions defining die time at which property is 
acquired Ml into two classes: diose which adopt the source of 
funds rule, and those which avoid the issue." Ihrner, supra, at 
354, app. A 
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BEAN & SMEDLEY 
Emilie A. Bean (6178) 
Attorney for Petitioner 
190 South Fort Lane, #2 
Layton, Utah 84041 
Telephone: (801) 544-4221 
IN TEE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR DAVIS COUNTY 
FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
LOUISE A. SYMES, : FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Petitioner, : 
vs. : 
MERLIN DAVID SYMES, : 
: Civil No. 9747 02275 
Respondent. : 
This matter came on regularly for trial on Thursday and 
Friday, October 8 th and 9 th, 1998 at the Lay ton District Court, the 
Honorable Darwin C. Hansen, presiding. Petitioner was present and 
represented by her attorney, Emilie A. Bean. Respondent was also 
present and represented by Steven C. Tycksen. The Court having 
heard the testimony of the parties and the witnesses on behalf of 
each party and received exhibits into evidence, and now being fully 
informed in the premises, hereby enters the following 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Both parties were residents of Davis County for more than 
three months immediately prior to the commencement of this action. 
2. The parties were married on the 21st day of October, 1970, 
Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, Utah. 
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3. No children have been born as issue of the marriage and 
none are expected, however each party has children from a prior 
marriage. 
4. Irreconcilable differences have recently developed causing 
an irretrievably breakdown in the marriage relationship. Those 
difference include unilateral control of marital funds, verbal 
abusef threats of physical assault directed toward petitioner by 
respondent. Respondent's past conduct has caused petitioner to be 
fearful for her physical safety. Consequently, the resolution of 
the issues in this matter should be with an effort to eliminate any 
legal obligations running in favor of either party if equity can 
still be achieved. The Court therefore concludes that petitioner 
should be granted a Decree of Divorce from respondent with the same 
to become final immediately upon entry. 
5. Petitioner is 62 years of age. She receives Social 
Security benefits in the sum of $390.00 per month. She has no 
other income. Her health is poor. She is receiving medical care 
for abdominal, colon, bladder and heart problems. It is 
problematical as to whether she can be meaningfully employed 
although she testified that most of her problems are stress related 
and may abate somewhat following the divorce. Monthly medication 
costs currently approximate $300.00. She has worked during most of 
the marriagef primarily for employers with whom her husband also 
worked. They have lived in Florida, Oregon, California and, for 
the last 19 years, in Utah, due to respondent's employment. 
6. Petitioner's monthly expenses are as follows; 
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Electricity $ 55,00 
Gas 70.00 
Telephone 60.00 
Water and Garbage 50.00 
Food 200.00 
Clothing 40.00 
Gas for Car 60.00 
Car Repair 80.00 
Medical (Medication) 300.00 
Doctor (Not Paid by Ins.) 80.00 
TOTAL $1,035.00 
which the Court finds reasonable in total but not necessarily/ 
reasonable as to each line item. 
7. Respondent is 67 years of age and also receives Social 
Security benefits in the monthly sum of $893.00. He too is in ill 
health. He was injured in an industrial accident resulting in a 
closed head injury and suffered a hip fracture in a recent car 
accident. His employability is also problematical although he 
testified that he may find a minimum wage job which he hopes to do 
in the immediate future. 
8. Respondent is currently living with a son pursuant to a 
Second District Court Order in the matter styled, THE STATE OF UTAH 
vs. MERLIN SYMES, Case No. 971701418 (see respondent's Ex. #18). 
It is unknown how long that arrangement will last. However, 
assuming he may be allowed to live on his own sometime in the 
future, he estimates that his monthly expenses will be as follows: 
Rent $ 200.00 
Property Tax 60.00 
Utilities 50.00 
Repairs 50.00 
Phone 25.00 
Food 150.00 
Clothing 25.00 
Car Expense 50.00 
Entertainment 25.00 
Laundry 30.00 
Insurance 1*79.00 
Incidentals 50.00 
Gifts 60.00 
Medical 155.00 
TOTAL $1,089.00 
which the Court finds reasonable in total but not reasonable 
necessarily as to each line item. 
9« Petitioner is in need of income above her current 
allotment. Respondent is also in need of more than his allotment. 
10. There was no testimony as to indebtedness at trial except 
as to medical bills. 
11. One of the central issues in this case is whether certain 
property is marital or non-marital and the valuation of such 
property. During the marriage, the parties have maintained 
individual bank accounts. Some of the property has been titled in 
both names and some in respondent's name only or in conjunction 
with third parties. The Court concludes that all income of each 
party whether in a joint account or in separate accounts is marital 
property and should be accounted for as such. Moreover, the same 
is true for property titled in one or both of the parties' names 
and in property held in conjunction with third parties as the 
interests of the parties may occur. On the other hand, property 
brought into the marriage together with appreciation is non-marital 
property and is to be returned to the party who brought it into the 
marriage unless the exceptions cited in MORTENSEN vs. MORTENSEN, 
760 P.2d 304, 308 (Utah 1988) apply. Following are the Court's 
findings as to valuation and status of the marital estate: 
A. Bear Lake Cabin with adjacent vacant Lot: The 
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respondent owned an A-frame cabin and a 50 foot water front 
adjacent lot on the west shore of Bear Lake at the time of the 
parties' marriage. The lot was sold for $5,000.00 in 1971 to 
J. Gordon and Virjean Reynolds when the parties moved to 
Florida for respondent's work. It was allegedly repurchased 
by respondent's four children in 1974 for $20,000.00 although 
a deed was not signed by the Reynolds until April 18, 1980 and 
not recorded until September 18, 1997. The lot is considered 
to have a current value of $50,000.00. Improvements have been 
made to the lot including fill dirt, sprinkler system, sod and 
retaining wall. Most of the labor and costs were borne by 
respondent's children and some by respondent. Petitioner made 
no contribution to the adjacent lot. Therefore, the Court 
finds that the lot is non-marital property. 
On the other hand, the cabin, which also has a 50 foot 
water front frontage, has been in the name of respondent since 
the marriage. Moreover, the cabin has been significantly 
enlarged and remodeled. It has been insured under both 
parties' names. Taxes and most of the cost associated with 
the improvements have been paid from marital funds. The 
remodel has been done by respondent with the aid of his two 
sons as a quid pro quo for respondent's assistance with their 
improvements of the adjacent lot. Over the years, petitioner 
has taken care of the domestic chores associated with the 
cabin and its lot while respondent has handled the physical 
improvements and financial matters associated with the cabin. 
The entire family has used both the cabin and the adjacent lot 
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for recreational purposes. Household furnishings in the cabin 
have been contributed to by both petitioner and respondent 
from pre-marital property. The Court therefore concludes that 
petitioner has contributed to the enhancement, maintenance, 
and protection of the cabin and its associated lot throughout 
the 28 years of the marriage and thus it is marital property. 
The Court further concludes that the current value of the 
cabin is $119,000.00. However, that amount should be 
decreased by its value at the time of the marriage. 
Petitioner suggests that its original value should be based on 
the valuation by the county for property tax purposes which is 
$1,900.00. The Court rejects that notion. Respondent argues 
that the value at the time of the marriage is irrelevant. The 
Court also rejects that argument. If the adjacent lot, which 
is the same size as the cabin lot was worth $5,000.00 when 
initially sold to the Reynolds and is now worth $50,000.00, 
then by negative extrapolation, the cabin and its lot which is 
now worth $119,000.00 would have been valued at approximately 
$12,000.00 at the time of the parties7 marriage. And the 
Court so concludes. Therefore, the marital property value of 
the cabin and its lot is $119,000.00 less $12,000.00 of 
$107,000.00. 
B. Residence: The residence located in Layton, Utah, 
was purchased during the marriage and has a current value of 
$141,000.00. There is no mortgage outstanding. The home is 
marital property although respondent argues that he should 
receive a $30,661.00 credit against the home representing 
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moneys he paid to the mortgagee when the mortgage was paid 
off. He claims the source of those funds came from a lump sum 
payment for permanent partial impairment resulting from the 
industrial accident heretofore referred to. Those funds are 
non-marital property to which respondent is entitled leaving a 
balance of $110,339.00 as marital property in the residence. 
C. Vehicles: The following vehicles are marital 
property worth the values as indicated: 
1982 Zimmer $21,000.00 
1946 Lincoln 3,000.00 
1987 Marquis Unknown 
Other miscellaneous cars, 
Jet skis, snowmobiles, boat Unknown 
3 sets Chrome Wheels 1,600.00 
The Zimmer was purchased by respondent for $24,500.00. 
It was appraised at $15,000.00 or $16,000.00 without any road 
testing or careful examination. The low blue book is 
$21,000.00. The Court concludes that the blue book is the 
best appraisal. 
The vintage Lincoln is valued as a source of parts for 
those who are restoring a like vehicle. No valuation was 
testified to concerning the Marquis which petitioner is now 
driving and was a gift from her mother. It is therefore non-
marital property. The other miscellaneous vehicles are 
considered to have only salvage value. 
D. Jewelry: The following jewelry for each of the 
parties is valued as follows: 
Petitioner $14,470.00 
Respondent 10,845.00 
Respondent claims that certain items of jewelry are 
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missing but were in the parties7 residence when he was 
arrested on the criminal charges now pending against him. He 
further asserts that he is entitled to a credit against the 
marital estate on the grounds that petitioner has occupied the 
home since that time and should be held responsible for the 
missing items. Petitioner on the other hand claims that the 
home has been burglarized and vandalized since respondent's 
arrest. She implies that either respondent or others under 
his direction probably are the culprits and that the missing 
items were taken then. In the alternative, she speculates 
that before the arrest respondent took many items from the 
house and has them at some other location which may include 
the missing jewelry items. Neither party has met their burden 
of showing responsibility on the other as to the missing items 
and therefore the court makes no ruling as to those items nor 
considers them part of the marital estate. 
E. Doll Collection: Petitioner has collected dolls 
since she was a small child. Dolls collected before the 
marriage are non-marital property. Dolls collected after the 
marriage are marital property. The value of the collection 
after marriage is $8,000.00 and is part of the marital estate. 
F. Insurance: The cash value of the following three 
insurance policies issued by Alexander Hamilton Life are part 
of the marital estate: 
Policy #5094704 $11,809.00 
Policy #343673 2,371.00 
Policy #1816086 1,708.00 
G. Guns and ammunition: Respondent has acquired an 
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assortment of hand guns and long barrel guns with a supply of 
ammunition. It has a value of $lf100.00 and is a part of the 
marital estate. 
H. Cash: Respondent recently withdrew $10,000.00 from 
insurance policy No. 5094704 and deposited the same into a CD. 
While the transaction may not be in violation of the letter of 
paragraph 3C of the Order on Order to Show Cause issued by 
this Court on February 20f 1998, it was inconsistent with the 
spirit of the Order. The Court does not know whether the 
transaction resulted in the current cash value of the policy 
to be less than it might otherwise have been. In any event, 
the funds in the CD are marital property together with any 
accrued interest to date. 
I. St. George Property: The parties acquired an 
undivided one-half (h) interest in a piece of residential 
property in St. George, Utah, which was recently sold. The 
buyer paid $34,716.00 to the parties on or about August 5, 
1997, as part of that sale. All of the funds were put into 
respondent's bank account. $14,000.00 was divided between the 
parties pursuant to this Court's Order on Order to Show Cause 
issued February 20, 1997. The balance has not been accounted 
for by respondent. The funds are marital property. 
Petitioner should therefore receive a credit in the amount of 
$10,335.00 against the total marital estate before 
distribution which is one-half (%) of the unaccounted for 
balance. 
J. Household furnishings: The Court is not going to 
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value the household furnishings. There is no independent 
testimony from an appraiser as to their value. To attempt to 
value the property would be mere speculation. The Court does 
not find the testimony of respondent as to their value 
credible and therefore discounts the same. Neverthelessf each 
parties7 suggested division is fairly consistent. Pre-marital 
property is to go to the party who brought the item into the 
marriage. The marital property is to be divided as 
suggested. Specifically, however, respondent is to receive 
the jukebox. If the parties cannot agree on a distribution as 
to the balance, either may petition the Court for assistance 
as to those items on which there is a dispute. 
From the foregoing Findings of Factf the Court does hereby 
enter the following 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court has jurisdiction of the parties and subject 
matter in this action. 
2. Petitioner should be granted a divorce from respondent on 
the ground of irreconcilable differences, and the divorce should 
become final upon entry with the Clerk of the Court. 
3. The Court concludes that the following property 
distribution is equitable and that each party should be granted the 
following property as identified: 
ITEM PETITIONER RESPONDENT 
Bear Lake Cabin $107,000.00 
Residence: 
Value - $141f000.00 
Less - 30,661.00 
Plus - 10,335.00 
11 
$120,674.00 
1982 Zimmer 21,000.00 
1946 Lincoln 3,000.00 
Chrome Wheels & Misc. 
Vehicles 1,600.00 
Jewelry 14,470.00 10,845.00 
Doll Collection 8,000.00 
Insurance 
Policy #343673 2,371.00 
Policy #3094704 11,809.00 
Policy #1816086 1,708.00 
Cash (CD) 10,000.00 
Guns & Ammunition 1,100.00 
TOTAL $156,661.00 $156,916.00 
4. Respondent's personal injury claim has been reduced from 
the marital value of the residence and petitioner's share of the 
unaccounted for proceeds from the sale of the St. George property 
has been added for a net value of $120,674.00 leaving a sum of 
$20,326.00 (30,661.00-10,335.00) to be adjusted in favor of 
respondent. That adjustment is accounted for with regard to 
alimony mentioned below. 
5. Respondent's award of the guns and ammunition shall be 
subject to the Order of Criminal Court or any subsequent 
amendment• 
6. Due to the disparity in income, it is equitable that the 
parties' incomes be equalized so that they are placed on an even 
footing though that will still leave each short of meeting their 
needs. It may be that they will have to find some kind of 
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employment or sell some of their assets in order to make do. It is 
equitable for respondent to pay petitioner alimony in the sum of 
$251.00 per month. That amount results from the average of the two 
Social Security payments and adjusting the alimony so that the 
income of each party is equal. However, the Court concludes that 
there should be no alimony obligation on the part of respondent the 
result of which offsets respondent's right to receive payment for 
the balance of his personal injury funds in the amount of 
$20,326.00 which petitioner is taking as part of the equity in the 
marital residence. 
7. Each of the parties are to be responsible for their own 
indebtedness and to hold the other harmless thereon. Each party is 
responsible for his or her own medical bills. 
8. Petitioner may be restored to her maiden name if she 
chooses to hereafter be known as A. LOUISE ADKINS. 
9. Each of the parties is to be responsible for their own 
attorney's fees and costs of court. 
10. Each party is restrained from harassing, abusing or 
threatening the other. A police officer is to be present when 
respondent's personal property currently stored at petitioner's 
residence is picked up. Respondent's designee is to remove all of 
respondent's property at petitioner's residence within 30 days 
following the entry of the Decree of Divorce in that respondent has 
been ordered to stay away from petitioner's home in the Order of 
the Criminal Court. 
11. Each of the parties is to cooperate in the execution of 
any documents necessary to finalize all aspects of the Decree of 
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Divorce to be issued in this matter. 
DATED ^ _ __ 
BY 
be i s sued in t h i s matter. 
this / ^ d a y of /^Jjff , 199^ 
N O T I C E 
You will please take notice that the undersigned, attorney 
for petitioner, will submit the above and foregoing FINDINGS OF 
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to the Judge of the above-entitled 
Court for his signature, upon the expiration of five (5) days from 
the date this Notice is mailed to you, and after allowing three (3) 
days for mailing, unless written objection is filed prior to that 
time, pursuant to Rule 4-504(2), Rules of Judicial Administration. 
Kindly govern yourself accordingly. 
DATED this //,& day of ^ Jm^f^J^ 1998. 
EMILIE A. BEAN 
Attorney for Petitioner 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this /& day of ~2fs!A&»J*>^ 1998, I 
mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law to Steven C. Tycksen, Attorney at Law, 11519 
Nicklaus Road, PO Box 480, Draper UT 84020-0480, postage prepaid. 
BEAN & SMEDLEY 
Emilie A. Bean (6178) 
Attorney for Petitioner 
190 South Fort Lane, #2 
Layton, Utah 84041 
Telephone: (801) 544-4221 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR DAVIS COUNTY 
FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
LOUISE A. SYMES, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
MERLIN DAVID SYMES, 
Respondent. 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. 9747 02275 
This matter came on regularly for trial on Thursday and 
Friday, October 8 th and 9 th, 1998 at the Lay ton District Court, the 
Honorable Darwin C. Hansen, presiding. Petitioner was present and 
represented by her attorney, Emilie A. Bean. Respondent was also 
present and represented by Steven C. Tycksen. The Court having 
heard the testimony of the parties and the witnesses on behalf of 
each party and received exhibits into evidence, and now being fully 
informed in the premises, and having heretofore made and entered 
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, does hereby ORDER, 
ADJUDGE AND DECREE: 
1. Petitioner is granted a divorce from respondent on the 
ground of irreconcilable differences, and the and the bond of 
m a t r i mini my in n Il IK M 1 J n i \t II i m | lit« I wn m in |n ,4 i I I M I K I J II II II ill 
]ic:i p o n d e n t i s h e r e b y d i s s o l v e d , and t h e d i v o r c e s h a l l b e c o m e f i n a l 
upon e n t r y wi t h t: ,1IP C l e r k of t h e Cm IIII I 
2 . E a c h p a i t\ i i1.. a w a i d e d 1, IHJ 1 u l l o w i iinji p r o p e j t\ 
identified below: 
ITEM PETITIONER RESPONDENT 
Beai •- .._:„, n $] 07 000 00 
Residencei 
Value - ^ ^ , . ^ . w J 
Less - 30,661.00 
Plus I 
J 
lyil ' mi rnmpr 
1946 Lincoln 
C h r o m e W h e e l i- I Il Il in « 
V e II i mi i" • 1 1 ' « 
J e w * 1 1 mi I, 
Tii i I I i t « l l e c t i o n 
I n s u r a n c e 
Policy #343673 
Policy #3094704 
Policy #1816086 
Cast i( : Il ) 
Guns & Ammuni t ion 
( S u b j e c t t o C o u r t O n l f I IIIIIII i i IIII I  I I I IIIIIII Il I t - ir | 
TOTAL $ 1 5 6 , 6 6 1 . 0 0 $ 1 5 6 , 9 1 6 . 0 0 
3 . R e s p o n d e n t ' s p e r s o n a l i n j u r y c l a i m h a s beeni r e d u c e d from, 
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-—- *
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 * v a l u e of $ 1 7 0 , 6 7 4 . 0 0 l e a v i n g a sum o f 
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respondent. Thdt adjustment is accounted iur with regau : . 
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8 ,000 .00 
0 
0 
n 
3. 000..JO 
1 , 6 0 0 . 0 0 
l i i . i M ' i no 
2 , 3 7 1 . 0 0 
10, 000 . (10 
1 , 1 0 0 . 0 0 
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alimony mentioned below. 
4. The marital property is to be divided by the suggested 
division of the parties. Specifically, however, respondent is to 
receive the jukebox. If the parties cannot agree on a distribution 
as to the balance, either may petition the Court for assistant as 
to those items on which there is a dispute. Par-marital property 
is to go to the party who brought the item into the marriage. 
5. Respondent is awarded the guns and ammunition subject to 
the Order of Criminal Court or any subsequent amendment. 
6. It is ordered that respondent pay to petitioner alimony in 
the sum of $251.00 per month. That amount results from the average 
of the two Social Security payments and adjusting the alimony so 
that the income of each party is equal. However, the Court 
concludes that there should be no alimony obligation on the part of 
respondent the result of which offsets respondent's right to 
receive payment for the balance of his personal injury funds in the 
amount of $20,326.00 which petitioner is taking as part of the 
equity in the marital residence. 
7. Each of the parties is responsible for their own 
indebtedness and to hold the other harmless thereon. Each party is 
responsible for his or her own medical bills. 
8. Petitioner may be restored to her maiden name if she 
chooses to hereafter be known as A. LOUISE ADKINS. 
9. Each of the parties is to pay his or her own attorney's 
fees and costs of court. 
10. Each party is restrained from harassing, abusing or 
threatening the other• A police officer is to be present when 
4 
respondent's personal property currently stored at petitioner's 
residence is picked up. Respondent's designee is in remove all of 
respondPIIII'! s f ' o|: ' «, n rwidi-'LU'i i I I i 10 I I M * i"> 
following the entry ot the Decree of Divorce in that res| i «I*1-n I. has 
beei rdered to stay away from petitioner's home in the Order of 
r : "t. 
1" «*fi ol the parties is ordered to cooperate in the 
t, ion of any documents necessary to finalize all aspects of the 
< « " I H i } i i .i I Il him en I i It 11 Lb m a t t e r . 
"  IK, III t h I »t y ^ y dav o f S ' ^ / ~* 19 & 
N 0 1 1 L E 
ii w i ] 3 please take notice that the undersigned, attorney 
i 1 itioner, will submit the above and foregoing DECREE OF 
i/ivORCE to the Judge of the above-entitled Court for his signature, 
upon the expiration of five (5) days from the date this Notice is 
mailed to^you, and after allowing three (3) days for mailing, 
unless written objection is filed prior to that time, pursuant to 
Rule 4-504(2), Rules of Judicial Administration. 
l
"
1
" •'!. ?';?!"•.'! "i j ."""'".M"  , _, jurself accordirigI;, 
I'ISW this I fa & day of [(n^f^J^ 1 IL»'90 . 
EMILIE A. BEAN 
Attorney for Pet :i I::i Dner 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this /&& day o f - ^ ^ n X i ^ 1998, I 
mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Decree of Divorce 
to Steven C. Tycksen, Attorney at Law, 11519 Nicklaus Road, PO Box 
480, Draper UT 84020-0480, postage prepaid. 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
F < If !I i Ill il11" II ".Il rill1 II III [ • " [ ' A,,, I I - I I I III I l l II III!, 11,1' r ||- ' ill III III III I l l 
LOUISE A . : ' : MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Petitio T : 
vs. 
: Case No. 974702275 
MERLIN DAVID SYMES, : 
Respondent : Judge; DARWIN C. HANSEN 
The above-entitled action came on for trial on the 8th and 9th days of October, 
1998. Petitioner appeared personally and through her counsel Emiliie A Bear i 
Respondent appeared personally and through his counsel Steven C. Tycksen. The 
Court took the matter under advisement after hearing testimony and the arguments of 
counsel. Based thereon, the Court now makes and enters its Memorandum Decision 
as follows: 
1 I! IRISDICTION: Both of the Parties have been residents of Davis County more 
tl lai in tl i ree months immediately prior to the filing of the complaint in this action 
2. MARRIAGE STATIST,oo. . he Parties were mar i ied on the 21 st day of O c t o — 
1970 in Salt Lake City, L Iti \\ I. 
3. C H I L U K L N : N O children have been bor «~ .—. , 
each party has children from a prior marriage. 
4. GROIII Ill I!! III! reconcilable differences have recently developed causing an 
irretrievable II ' H. ill Jown in the marriage relationship. Those differences include 
unilateral control of marital funds, verbal abuse, threats and physical assault directed 
toward Petitioner by Respondent. Respondent's past conduct has caused Petitioner to 
be fearful for her physical safety. Consequently, the resolution of the issues in this 
matter should be with an effort to eliminate any legal obligations running in favor of 
either Party if equity can still be achieved. The Court therefore concludes that 
Petitioner should be granted a Decree of Divorce from Respondent with the same IIi: 
become final immediately i ipon entry 
5. PETITIONER'S INCOME AND EXPENSES: Petitioner is 82 years of age. She 
receives Social Security Benefits in the sum of $390 per month. She has no other 
income. Her health is poor. She is receiving medical care for abdominal, colon, 
bladder and heart problems. It is problematical as to whether she can be meaningfully 
employed although she testified that most of her problems are stress related and may 
abate somewhat following the divorce. Monthly medication costs currently approximate 
$300. She has worked during most of the marriage, primarily for employers with whom 
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her husband also worked. They have lived in Florida, Oregon, California and, for the 
last 19 years, in Utah, due to Respondent's employment. 
Petitioner claims her monthly expenses are as follows: 
Electricity 
Gas 
Telephone 
Water and Garbage 
Food 
Clothing 
Gas for Car 
Car Repair 
Medical (medication) 
Doctor (Not pd by ins) 
TOTAL 
$ 55 
70 
60 
50 
200 
40 
60 
80 
300 
80 
$1035 
which the Court finds reasonable in total but not necessarily reasonable as to each 
line item. 
6. RESPONDENTS INCOME AND EXPENSES: Respondent is 67 years of age 
and also receives Social Security Benefits in the monthly sum of $893. He too is in ill 
health. He was injured in an industrial accident resulting in a closed head injury and 
suffered a hip fracture in a recent car accident. His employability is also problematical 
although he testified that he may find a minimum wage job which he hopes to do in the 
immediate future. 
Respondent is currently living with a son pursuant to a Second District Court 
Order in the matter styled, THE STATE OF UTAH vs. MERLYN SYMES, Case No. 
971701418 (see Respondent's Ex. #18). It is unknown how long that arrangement will 
last. However, assuming he may be allowed to live on his own sometime in the future, 
he estimates that his monthly expenses will be as follows: 
Rent 
Property Taxes 
Utilities 
Repairs 
Phone 
Food 
Clothing 
Car Expense 
Entertainment 
Laundry 
Insurance 
Incidentals 
$ 200 
60 
50 
50 
25 
150 
25 
50 
25 
30 
179 
50 
3 
Gifts bU 
Medical 155 
THTAI $1,089 
which \\)p f mi mi ( In i I I"PI I nniflblt1 ill 1 l.il II ill in II ip-ismm il I||H necessaril > ir t r irhi lliiiii 
item. 
7. PROPERTY VALUATION AND STATUS: One of the central issues in this case 
is whether certain property is marital or non-marital and the valuation of such property. 
During the marriage, the Parties have maintained individual bank accounts. Some of 
the property has been titled in both names and some in Respondent's name only or in 
conjunction with third parties. The Court concludes that all income of each Party 
whether in a joint account or in separate accounts is marital property and should be 
accounted for as such. Moreover, the same is true for property titled in one or both of 
the Parties' names and in property held in conjunction with third parties as the interests 
of the Parties may occur. On the other hand, property brought into the marriage 
together with appreciation is non-marital property and is to be returned to the Party who 
brought it into the marriage unless the exceptions cited in MORTENSEN v 
MORTENSEN, 760 P.2d 304, 308 (Utah 1988) apply. Following are the Court's 
findings as to valuation and status of the marital estate: 
A. Bear Lake Cabin with adjacent vacant Lot: The Respondent owned 
an A^frame cabin and a 50 foot water front adjacent lot on the west shore of Bear Lake 
at the time of the Parties' marriage. The lot was sold for $5000 in 1971 to J. Gordon 
and Virjean Reynolds when the Parties moved to Florida for Respondent's work. It was 
allegedly repurchased by Respondent's four children in 1974 for $20,000 although a 
deed was not signed by the Reynolds until April 18, 1980 and not recorded until Sept. 
18, 1097 The lot is considered to have a current value of $50,000. Improvements 
have been made to the lot including fill dirt, sprinkler system, sod and retaining wall 
Most of the labor and costs were born by Respondent's children and some by 
Respondent. Petitioner made no contribution to the adjacent lot. Therefore, the coui I 
linds that the lot is non-marital property. 
On the other hand, the cabin, which also has a bU toot water front frontage, 
has been in the name of Respondent since the marriage. Moreover, the cabin has 
been significantly enlarged and remodeled. It has been insured under both Parties' 
names. Taxes and most of the cost associated with the improvements have been paif I 
from marital funds. The remodel has been done by Respondent with the aid of his two 
sons as a quid pro quo for Respondent's assistance with their improvement of the 
adjacent lot. Over the years, Petitioner has taken care of the domestic chores 
associated with the cabin and its lot while Respondent has handled the physical 
improvements and financial matters associated with the cabin. The entire family has 
used both the cabin and the adjacent lot for recreational purposes. Household 
furnishings in the cabin have been contributed to by both Petitioner and Responds il 
from pre-marital property. The Court therefore concludes that Petitioner has 
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contributed to the enhancement, maintenance, and protection of the cabin and its 
associated lot throughout the 28 years of the marriage and thus it is marital property. 
The Court further concludes that the current value of the cabin is $119,000. 
However, that amount should be decreased by its value at the time of the marriage. 
Petitioner suggests that its original value should be based on the valuation by the 
county for property tax purposes which is $1900. The Court rejects that notion. 
Respondent argues that the value at the time of the marriage is irrelevant. The Court 
also rejects that argument. If the adjacent lot, which is the same size as the cabin lot, 
was worth $5,000 when initially sold to the Reynolds and is now worth $50,000, then by 
negative extrapolation the cabin and its lot which is now worth $119,000 would have 
been valued at approximately $12,000 at the time of the Parties1 marriage. And the 
Court so concludes. Therefore the marital property value of the cabin and its lot is 
$119,000 less $12,000 or $107,000. 
B. Residence: The residence located in Layton, Utah, was purchased 
during the marriage and has a current value of $141,000. There is no mortgage 
outstanding. The home is marital property although Respondent argues that he should 
receive a $30,661 credit against the home representing monies he paid to the 
mortgagee when the mortgage was paid off. He claims the source of those funds came 
from a lump sum payment for permanent partial impairment resulting from the industrial 
accident heretofore referred to. Those funds are non-marital property to which 
Respondent is entitled leaving a balance of $110,339 as marital property in the 
residence. 
C. Vehicles: The following vehicles are marital property with the values 
as indicated: 
1982Zimmer $21,000 
1946 Lincoln $ 3,000 
1987 Marquis unk 
Other miscellaneous 
cars, jet skis, snow-
mobiles, boat unk 
3 sets chrome 
Wheels $ 1600 
The Zimmer was purchased by Respondent for $24,500. It was appraised at 
$15,000 or $16,000 without any road testing or careful examination. The low blue book 
is $21,000. The Court concludes that the blue book is the best appraisal. 
The vintage Lincoln is valued as a source of parts for those who are restoring a 
like vehicle. No valuation was testified to concerning the Marquis which Petitioner is 
now driving and was a gift from her mother. It is therefore non- marital property. The 
other miscellaneous vehicles are considered to have only salvage value. 
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L. uewelry: The following \ewp\p for Or\r\\ t HIP Parties is valuprl as 
follows: 
" ™
a r
 $14,470 
$10,845 
Respondent claims that certain items of jewelry are missing but were ii i the 
Parties' residence when he was arrested on the criminal charges now pending against 
him. He further asserts that he is entitled to a credit against the marital estate on the 
grounds that Petitioner has occupied the home since that time and should be held 
responsible for the missing items. Petitioner on the other hand claims that the home 
has been burglarized and vandalized since Respondent's arrest. She implies that 
either Respondent or others under his direction probably are the culprits and that the 
missing items were taken then. In the alternative, she speculates that before the arrest 
Respondent took many items from the house and has them at some other location 
which may include the missing jewelry items. Neither Party has met their burden of 
showing responsibility on the other as to the missing items and therefore the Court 
makes no ruling as to those items nor considers them part of the marital estate. 
E. Doll Collection: Petitioner has collected dolls since she was a small 
child. Dolls collected before the marriage are non-marital property. Dolls collected after 
the marriage are marital property. The value of the collection after marriage is $8,000 
and is part of the marital estate. 
p^  insurance: The cash value of the following three insurance poln. i s 
issued by Alexander Hamilton I ife are part of the marital estate: 
Policy # :. 11 i i | $11,809 
Policy # 343673 $ 2,371 
Policy* 1816086 $ 1, 708 
G. Guns and ammunition; Respondent has acquired an assortment of 
hand guns and long barrel guns with a supply of ammuniti ::: i i It has a value of $1,100 
and is a part of the marital estate 
H. Cash; Respondent recently withdrew $10,000 from insurance policy 
No. 5094704 and deposited the same into a CD. Wf tile tl le transaction may not be in 
violation of the letter of paragraph 3C. of the Order on Order to Show Cause issued by 
this Court on Feb. 20, 1998, it was inconsistent with the spirit of the Order. The Court 
does not know whether the transaction resulted in the current cash value of the policy 
to be less than it might otherwise have been. In any event, the funds in the CD are 
marital property together with any accrued interest to date. 
I St. George Property: The Parties acquired an undivided Vz interest in a 
piece of residential property in St George, Utah, which was recently sold. The buyer 
paid $34,716 to the Parties on or about Ai igust 5, 1997, as part of that sale. AH of the 
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funds were put into Respondent's bank account. $14,000 was divided between the 
Parties pursuant to this Court's Order on Order to Show Cause issued February 20, 
1997. The balance has not been accounted for by Respondent. The funds are marital 
property. Petitioner should therefore receive a credit in the amount of $10,335 against 
the total marital estate before distribution which is 1/4 of the unaccounted for balance. 
J. Household furnishings: The Court is not going to value the household 
furnishings. There is no independent testimony from an appraiser as to their value. To 
attempt to value the property would be mere speculation. The Court does not find the 
testimony of Respondent as to their value credible and therefore discounts the same. 
Nevertheless, each Parties' suggested division is fairly consistent. Pre-marital property 
is to go to the Party who brought the item into the marriage. The marital property is to 
be divided as suggested. Specifically, however, Respondent is to receive the jukebox. 
!f the Parties cannot agree on a distribution as to the balance, either may petition the 
Court for assistance as to those items on which there is a dispute. 
8. PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION: The Court concludes that the following property 
distribution is equitable: 
ITEM 
Bear Lake Cabin 
Residence: 
Value-$141,000 
Less - $ 30,661 
Plus - $ 10.335 
"82" Zimmer 
"46" Lincoln 
Chrome Wheels & Misc 
vehicles 
Jewelry 
Doll Collection 
Insurance: 
Policy # 343673 
Policy # 5094704 
Pol icy* 1816086 
PETITIONER 
$120,674 
$ 14,470 
$ 8,000 
$ 11,809 
$ 1,708 
RESPONDENT 
$107,000 
$ 21,000 
$ 3,000 
$ 1,600 
$ 10,845 
$ 2,371 
Cash (CD) $ 10,000 
7 
Guns and Ammunition * I . I U J 
™ "
r A
' $156,661 $156,916 
Respondent's personal injury claim has been reduced from the marital value of 
the residence and Petitioner's share of the unaccounted for proceeds from the sale of 
the St. George property has been added for a net value of $120,674 leaving a sum of 
$20,326 (30,661-10,335) to be adjusted in favor of Respondent. That adjustment is 
accounted for with regard to alimony mentioned below. 
Respondent's award of the guns and ammunition shall ho subject to thr Oder of 
the Criminal Court or any subsequent amendment. 
9 ALIMONY: Though both Parties are currently receiving Social Security Benefits, 
there is still a disparity of income as mentioned above. Petitioner is in need of income 
above her current allotment. Respondent is also in need of more than his allotment. It 
is equitable however, for their incomes to be equalized so that they are placed on an 
even footing though that will still leave each short of meeting their needs. It may be, 
that they will have to find some kind of employment or sell some of their assets in order 
to make do. In any event, it is equitable for Respondent to pay Petitioner alimony in the 
sum of $251 per month. That amount results from the average of the two SS payments 
and adjusting the alimony so that the income of each Party is equal. However, the 
Court concludes that there should be no alimony obligation on the part of Respondent 
the result of which off-sets Respondent's right to receive payment for the balance of his 
personal injury funds in the amount of $20,326 which Petitioner is taking as part of the 
equity in the marital residence 
10. DEBTS AND OBLI 3 I Il Df IS Each of the Parties are to be responsible for tl In 
own indebtedness and to hold the other harmless thereon. There was no testimony as 
to indebtedness presented at trial except for each Parties, medical bills which they are 
to pay. 
11 MAIDEN NAME: Petitioner may be restored to her maiden-name if she chooses. 
The request was made by her counsel in the opening statement but no testimony as to 
the maiden name was presented at trial. The name may be inserted in the Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and in the Decree of Divorce if appropriate. 
12 ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS: Each of the Parties are to be responsible for 
their own Attorney's Fees and Costs of Court. 
13. RESTRAINING ORDER: Each Party is restrained from harassing, abusing or 
threatening the other. A Police Officer is to be present when Respondent's personal 
property currently stored at Petitioner's residence is picked up Respondent's designee 
is to remove all of Respondent's property at Petitioner's residence within 30 days 
following the entry of the Decree of Divorce in that Respondent has been Ordered to 
stay away from Petitioner's home in the Order of the Criminal Coi irt 
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14. COOPERATION: Each of the Parties are to cooperate in the execution of any 
documents necessary to finalize all aspects of the Decree of Divorce to be issued in 
this matter. 
15. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS: The Court requests counsel for Petitioner to 
prepare final Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce. The 
pleadings are to be prepared and reviewed by both counsel in accordance with Rule 
4-504, Code of Judicial Administration, and then submitted to the Court for review and 
signature. 
DATED this ^b#-dav of October, 1998. 
"VE COURT^ 
Darwin C. Hansen - Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed the Memorandum Decision, postage pre-paid, first 
class U.S. mail, to the following: 
Emilie A. Bean Steven C. Tycksen 
Attorney for Petitioner Attorney for Respondent 
190 South Fort Lane, #2 P.O. Box 480 
Layton, UT 84041 Draper, UT 84020 
DATED this $Ctfi. day of October, 1998. 
Deputy Court Clerk 
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Steven C. Tycksen (3300) 
Lone Peak Law Offices, P.C. 
Attorney for Respondent 
Post Office Box 480 
Draper, Utah 84020-0480 
Telephone: (801) 572-2700 
Facsimile: (801) 553-1618 
: R » ' i 
Nov 25 
)LF? ;:;-JRT 
P . ._ 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
LOUISE A. SYMES, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
MERLIN DAVID SYMES, 
Respondent 
MOTION TO ASSESS COSTS 
r c o 
Case No.-£74902275 
Judge: Darwin C. Hansen 
COMES NOW, Respondent, Merlin David Symes, by and through counsel Slew 
Tycksen, arid liereb) mo i es this C :>i III: I: t :> \ ssess Costs Incurred by the Respondent for th-
and the expert, 'witnesses as listed in the attached Exhibit ' \ as costs against:: . 
AS GROUNDS THEREFORE, Respondent states and. alleges as follows: 
I I In1 i nut r H r d upon mil ni»rd this pvirlcmT in rinking its decision, and the costs to 
procuCL UK, same should thereiorc app, 
division of assets. 
DATED and yiifMl; this/ c> an „ " 
:,ea a~ &:\ expt;^-. esiluili" pi in iii I J Mi i' 
StevffirrC. Tycksen 
Attorney for Respondent 
1 MAILING CERTIFICATE 
2 I certify that I am employed by the office of Steven C. Tycksen, and that I mailed a 
3 I correct copy of the foregoing, postage pre-paid, to the following: 
4.. 
Emile Bean 
5 || BEAN & SMEDLEY 
190 South Fort Lane, Suite 2 
6 || Layton, UT 84041 
7 li on this ' J day of November, 1998. / /-/C~\ 
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EXHIBIT 'A' 
Colleen Olson (doll Appraisals) $750.00 
Ardell Brown (Zimmer Appraisal) $200.00 
Derek Lamb (Layton Home Appraisal) $510.00 
W.R. Peterson (Bear Lake Appraisal $575.00 
Payne Anthony Jewlers (Jewelry Appraisal) $350.00 
TOTAL $2385.00 
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Steven C. Tycksen (3300) 
Attorney for Defendant 
Lone Peak Law Offices, P.C. 
Post Office Box 480 
Draper, Utah 84020-0480 
Telephone: (801) 572-2700 
Facsimile: (801) 553-1618 
/.£•.• 
' ' ' ' # 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
LAYTON DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
LOUISE A. SYMES, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MERLIN DAVID SYMES, 
Defendant. 
MOTION TO RE-CONSIDER COURTS 
RULING AND/OR RE- OPEN TRIAL TO TAKE 
ADDITIONAL TESTIMONY AND EVIDENCE 
Civil No. 974702275 
Judge Rodney S. Page 
COMES NOW, the Defendant, by and through counsel, Steven C. Tycksen, and does hereby 
move this Court to re-consider its ruling on a few issues and/or re-open the trial to take additional 
testimony. The issues that need to be re-addressed are as follows: 
1. The Court found that there was not an adequate accounting of what happened to the 
money which the parties received from the sale of the St. George property. The Court assumed and 
concluded that the money was not spent for marital purposes and still exists. Because of this assumption 
the Court ordered the unaccounted for money divided equally. In the Defendant's testimony at trial he 
indicated that he had no hoard or stash of money left over from the sale of the property, that he gave half 
of the last installment to Plaintiff, and that he had spent the other portion of the money on marital 
expenses. The Defendant did not anticipate that this issue would require further documentation because 
it was never raised in the pleadings and was not addressed in the Pre-Trial order as an issue for Trial. 
1 
1 He "¥v as tl lei efoi s n :: 1: pi epai ed to demonstrate v •. documentation to Y>urt at 
2 otherwise he would ha\ e produced Ms banking records M *eover, the documentation he would have 
3 needed to do so was not available to him. because all of his financial records were in Plaintiffs possession 
4 and still! iiii I Hi • I talciuLiril shnulil mi I In n xpak'il In .tiiilm ipiilc lliii ISMJC and I it. In Id In <J 'iltimliinl nl 
5 having failed to document his testimony under these circumstances. The Defendant should therefore be 
6 allowed access to his personal financial records in Plaintiffs possession or be given an opportun ity to 
7 request (I'linm ti il\ I pjcstiil 11,11)1",. cvidniH1 In Ik1 ( 'mill In '-In '" Ii » Ill '" 
8 funds were distributee: •.;.. * •. sieves these records will demonstrate to the Court's satisfaction that 
9 all of these fiinds were ST>.*T" W purposes Defendant asks the Court to be allowed to present this 
10 evider - x ;.-
11 and change it's ruling on this issue in view of his statements to the contrary. As a comparative coi ollary 
12 to this the Defendant never knew that his wife had been receiving "Social Security" income during the 
14 i eceiving it for several years His testimony was that he used his resources to support the 'family I le 
15 gave hei money to live on and paid the family bills. He did not know she had othei income. 1 \llo 
18 should also be required to be explain and document the disposition of these marital fiinds or they should 
19 be divided equally in fairness to both parties 
2 ... mi he Defendant asks the Court; to re-open the trial to alio a him to provide evidence of the 
21 | vaiue of the Bear Lake Cabin at the time of the parties marriage. I'he appraiser who appraised the 
22 property and te<t:f ed a1 fnal was not prepared to cive an opinion ^~ *Ur> value of th* cabin at ih 4-~? 
2 3 " ,_ • .i name ant i::. .. . JCL ., _ 
24 it as a marital asset. The only issue Defendant believed was properly before the Court was the value of 
25 the additions or modifications and this was the evidence Defendant presented,, The Defendant presented 
27 I the Defendant's sons. I he Court chose not to rely on this ei idence and instead speculated on the value 
28 
1 of the Cabin at the time of the parties marriage by assuming mat me appreciation of the cabin was the 
2 same as the appreciation of the land. There was no evidence provided by either party at trial to support 
3 that assumption. Since the Court's ruling the Defendant has requested the appraiser to form that opinion 
4 and he further believes that the Plaintiff is in possession of other of his financial records which can 
5 demonstrate the value of the Cabin at the time of the parties marriage in a more accurate fashion. This 
6 evidence was not available to him at trial because all of his financial records were in Plaintiffs possession 
7 and she refused to turn over Defendant's property. The Defendant therefore asks the Court to allow this 
8 additional evidence to be provided and considered by the Court in a re-opened trial or evidentiary hearing 
9 and/or asks the Court to allow Defendant to submit this information to the Court by Affidavit and have 
10 the Court reconsider its ruling on this matter. 
11 3. The Court failed to make any division of personal property in its ruling but suggested that 
12 the parties should work it out. This ruling ignores the history of this case and the repeated difficulty 
13 Defendant has had in obtaining any of his property. Without specific guidance from the Court the present 
14 ruling leaves the parties right where they have been, unable to agree on anything. Defendant respectfully 
15 requests the Court to reconsider its ruling and make specific awards of property and definite orders for 
16 how and when the Defendant may pick up his property. 
17 4. The Court specifically ordered that the parties each pay their own attorney fees and costs. 
18 However, Defendant incurred substantial costs and witness fees which should appropriately be ordered 
19 to be taxed as expenses of the marital estate. The Defendant spent nearly $4,000.00 in witness fees and 
20 appraisals. The Court relied heavily upon and used this evidence in making its ruling. As such, the costs 
21 incurred to provide this evidence created a benefit to both parties and the Court should therefore 
22 appropriately tax these costs as an expense of the marital estate and not solely to the Defendant. 
23 Defendant Respectfully requests the Court to reconsider this part of its ruling. 
24 DATED and SIGNED this 2 ^ d a y of November, 1! 
25 
26 I SfeVeft C. Tycksen 
Attorney for Defendant 
27" 
28 
1 
2 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I am employed by the office of Steven C. Tycksen, and that I mailed a true 
5 II and correct copy of the foregoing, postage pre-paid to the following: 
6 || Emilie Bean 
BEAN & SMEDLEY 
7 || 190 South Fort Lane, 
Layton, Utah 84041 
8 
9 || on this ££_ day of November, 1998. 
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BEAN & SMEDLEY 
Emilie A. Bean (6178) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
190 South Fort Lane, Suite 2 
Layton, UT 84041 
Telephone: (801) 544-4221 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
LOUISE A. SYMES, : RESPONSE TO MOTION 
: TO ASSESS COSTS 
Petitioner, : 
vs. : 
: Civil No. 9747 02275 
MERLIN DAVID SYMES, : 
Respondent. : 
Petitioner, Louise A. Symes, objects to respondent's Motion 
to Assess Costs on the following grounds: 
1. Respondent knew or should have know that he was 
incurring costs for appraisals and testimony which would not 
necessarily be divided as part of the marital estate expenses. 
Presumably, respondent hoped that the Court would rely on his 
expert witnesses, reports, and testimony. 
2. Had petitioner been able to afford appraisals, she would 
also have had her own expert testimony; however, based on the 
objection by respondent to cashing out a life insurance policy 
that was actually loosing value, petitioner was unable to afford 
her own experts and should not be responsible for any portion of 
the payments respondent must make to his expert witnesses. 
3. The Court's Memorandum Decision did not award respondent 
his expenses although respondent made the request at trial. The 
r:L£D!N CLERKS V-^^i 
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BEAN & SMEDLEY 
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EMILIE A. BEAN 
Attorney for Petitioner 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this 3**- day of December, 1998, 
I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing RESPONSE TO 
MOTION TO ASSESS COSTS to Steven C. Tycksen, Attorney at Law, PO 
Box 480, Draper, Utah 84020-0480, postage prepaid. 
22=22 *'~J ^ 
BEAN & SMEDLEY 
Emilie A. Bean (6178) 
Attorney for Petitioner 
190 South Fort Lane, #2 
Layton, Utah 84041 
Telephone: (801) 544-4221 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR DAVIS COUNTY 
FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
LOUISE A. SYMES, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
MERLIN DAVID SYMES, 
Respondent. 
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
TO RECONSIDER COURT'S RULING 
AND/OR REOPEN TRIAL TO TAKE 
ADDITIONAL TESTIMONY AND 
EVIDENCE 
Civil No. 9747 02275 
Petitioner, Louise A. Symes, by and through her counsel of 
record, hereby responds to respondent's Motion to Reconsider 
Court's Ruling and/or Reopen Trial to take Additional Testimony and 
Evidence, and objects to the Motion on the following grounds: 
1. The Court had a trial on this matter which exceeded the 
scheduled time estimated by counsel by one full day, at which time 
respondent had sufficient opportunity to present any relevant 
evidence he deemed appropriate. All of the claims made by 
respondent requesting new evidence are subject matter which 
respondent could have or should have anticipated would be at issue 
at trial. 
2. Specifically, respondent complains that the Court's 
decision with regard to the issue of division of the St. George 
2 
property did not account for respondent's claim that the funds were 
spent for marital purposes. Respondent fails to consider that 
petitioner sent discovery on August 12, 1998 requesting not only 
information and documentation with regard to the St. George 
property, but also respondent's bank records. In answer to 
discovery not only should respondent have recognized the issue of 
division of the St. George property, but also respondent's 
documentation could have and should have been prepared in answer to 
discovery. Petitioner received the answers to discovery after 
lunch on the first day of trial with no actual production of the 
documents requested. 
3. The Court heard ample evidence as to the lifestyle of the 
parties and the separation of their assets into entirely different 
bank accounts during the course of the marriage and therefore had 
sufficient grounds to conclude as a matter of law that petitioner 
did not receive her one-half of the proceeds of the sale of the St. 
George property. In addition, respondent fails to take into 
account that petitioner was a title holder on the property and was 
in her own right entitled to one-half of the parties' proceeds from 
sale to be used as she directed and not at respondent's whim. 
4. The Court considered the best evidence possible for 
valuation of the Bear Lake property at the time of the marriage. 
Even though detrimental to petitioner's position, the Court took 
the only logical approach on the valuation of the property as 
compared to tax notices. The Court used respondent's own appraiser 
to determine the percentage markup from the tax notice. On that 
basis, petitioner, who could not afford to do an appraisal, may 
3 
have taken any loss in the current market value if the appraiser 
favored his own client; however, in so figuring the Court then put 
the onus of any loss for a low appraisal on respondent for 
valuation at the time of marriage. Respondent's attorney requested 
that the Court evaluate the property on the percentage basis and 
respondent is now arguing against the request of his counsel in 
closing arguments. In addition, the Court determined that the 
improvements made by the parties during the course of the marriage 
were improvements made as part of the marriage and the source of 
the improvements or the funds were irrelevant. The Court's 
determination is squarely within the law. Respondent's children's 
testimony was self-serving with regard to improvements of the 
property and the sale of the adjacent property. The Court gave 
respondent's children the benefit of the adjacent property even 
though logically, given the length of time that had passed before 
the deed was recorded, it was likely held as a "dresser drawer" 
deed for inheritance purposes by respondent, and the Court would 
not have been beyond its discretion to consider the adjacent 
property as marital. 
5. The Court did not fail to make a division of personal 
property. The Court simply indicated that the parties should 
follow the lists provided as exhibits to the Court which the Court 
observed were largely consistent. For any inconsistencies, the 
Court made provision for dispute resolution. 
6. Respondent repeats his Motion for appraisal and witness 
fees in his Motion for Reconsideration which is the subject of 
respondent's prior Motion to Assess Costs. Petitioner cannot 
4 
expend attorney's fees in repeatedly answering the same issues and 
would request that the issue of payment of witness fees and 
appraisal costs be considered only as part of respondent's previous 
Motion or that the Court consider petitioner's attached Response to 
respondent's prior Motion as sufficient answer to this request. 
7. Petitioner is without sufficient funds to continually 
respond to respondent's post trial motions particularly where they 
are not grounded in law and are merely respondent's attempts to 
gain position greater than originally granted by the Court. 
Divorce courts are courts of equity leaving the judge with broad 
discretion as to accommodation in one area to equalize 
circumstances in another. Respondent would have the Court maintain 
its rulings with regard to all matters beneficial to him but deny 
equity to petitioner for any portion of the Court's ruling which 
may have benefited petitioner's position. 
WHEREFORE, petitioner requests that the Court deny 
respondent's Motion, and further that petitioner be granted $135.00 
in attorney's fees for having to answer a second and partially 
redundant post trial Motion. 
DATED this /(o^ day of December, 1998. 
BEAN & SMEDLEY 
EMILIE A. BEAN BEAN 
Attorney for Petitioner 
5 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this /^-^-day of December, 1998, I 
mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Response to Motion 
to Steven C. Tycksen, Attorney at Law, Lone Peak Law Offices, PO 
Box 480, Draper UT 84020-0480, postage prepaid. 
^^Jtifa*** J ^sdZfe^ 
BEAN & SMEDLEY 
Emilie A. Bean (6178) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
190 South Fort Lane, Suite 2 
Layton, UT 84041 
Telephone: (801) 544-4221 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT/ STATE OF UTAH 
LOUISE A. SYMES, : RESPONSE TO MOTION 
: TO ASSESS COSTS 
Petitioner, : 
VS • i 
: Civil No. 9747 02275 
MERLIN DAVID SYMES, : 
Respondent. : 
Petitioner, Louise A. Symes, objects to respondent's Motion 
to Assess Costs on the following grounds: 
1. Respondent knew or should have know that he was 
incurring costs for appraisals and testimony which would not 
necessarily be divided as part of the marital estate expenses. 
Presumably, respondent hoped that the Court would rely on his 
expert witnesses, reports, and testimony. 
2. Had petitioner been able to afford appraisals, she would 
also have had her own expert testimony; however, based on the 
objection by respondent to cashing out a life insurance policy 
that was actually loosing value, petitioner was unable to afford 
her own experts and should not be responsible for any portion of 
the payments respondent must make to his expert witnesses. 
3. The Court's Memorandum Decision did not award respondent 
his expenses although respondent made the request at trial. The 
2 
Judge chose not to award costs as requested by respondent in the 
Memorandum Decision. Asking again merely wastes petitioner's 
resources and having to respond to respondent's Motion. 
4. Petitioner did not have evidence to the contrary with 
regard to the appraised values of the martial residence and the 
Bear Lake cabin property, and petitioner's doll collection, and 
therefore was unable to argue those specific values. Petitioner 
believed that respondent's appraisals with regard to the jewelry 
and vehicles were so grossly inaccurate, a contrary appraisal was 
not even necessary to refute those claims. 
THEREFORE, petitioner objects to any requirement to share 
costs in the appraisals obtained by respondent for his self-
serving purpose and not as universal information to provide to 
the Court and requests that respondent be ordered to pay 
petitioner's attorney's fees in the amount of $132.00 for 
responding to respondent's frivolous motion. 
DATED this day of December, 1998. 
BEAN & SMEDLEY 
EMILIE A. BEAN 
Attorney for Petitioner 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this day of December, 1998, 
I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing RESPONSE TO 
MOTION TO ASSESS COSTS to Steven C. Tycksen, Attorney at Law, PO 
Box 480, Draper, Utah 84020-0480, postage prepaid. 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
SAKMINGTONDEPARTMENT, ST AXEOFUTAH 
LOUISE A.SYMES, 
vs. 
MERLIN DAVID SYMES, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. | 
RULING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
TO RE-CONSIDER OR RE-OPEN 
FOR ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE 
Case No. 974702275 DA 
Judge Darwin C. Hansen 
The above matter came on for hearing pursuant to Defendant's Motion to Re-Consider or Re-
Open for Additional Testimony. After reviewing the Court's Memorandum Decision and notes taken 
during the trial and the content of Defendant's motion, it is the Ruling of the Court that Defendant's 
Motion should be denied based upon Peay v. Peay, 607 P.2d 841, 843 (1980), with the exception of 
the issue regarding the distribution of personal property. As to that issue, the Court will take 
additional testimony. Counsel are directed to confer and identify those items which are in conflict 
and those for which there is agreement. The clerk will call counsel and arrange for a hearing date. 
Counsel is requested to prepare an order consistent with this ruling and submit the same to 
the Court for signature and entry. 
A DATED this %<? day of December, 1998. 
BY THE COURT: 
DARWIN C 
District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed the Ruling on Defendant's Motion to Re-Consider or Re-Open 
For Additional Evidence, postage pre-paid, first-class mail, to the following: 
Emilie A. Bean Steven C. Tycksen 
Attorney for Petitioner Attorney for Respondent 
190 South Fort Lane, #2 P.O. Box 480 
Layton, UT 84041 Draper, UT 84020-0480 
DATED this /((? day of December, 1998. 
Deputy Court Clerk 
2 
2nd District - Farmington Dept COURT 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LOUISE A. SYMES, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MERLIN DAVID SYMES, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
HEARING 
Case No: 974702275 DA 
Judge: DARWIN C. HANSEN 
Date: February 19, 1999 
Clerk: glendap 
TELEPHONE CONFERENCE 
PRESENT 
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): EMILIE A BEAN 
Defendant's Attorney(s): STEVEN C. TYCKSEN 
HEARING 
Attorney Tycksen is present by telephone and Attorney Bean is 
present in chambers. This hearing is continued to 3/23/99 at 4:00 
p.m. Counsel agree that Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
and the Divorce Decree get signed today. 
Court signs the Findings and the Decree. 
Dated this ^ ^ 2 day of Jh^J?. . 19/7. 
EN C. HANS] 
District Court Judge 
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Steven C. Tycksen (.^00) 
Lone Peak Law Offices, P.G 
Attorney for Defendant 
Post Office Box 480 
Draper, Utah 84020-0480 
Telephone (801) 572-2700 
Facsimile (801) 553-1618 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF DAVIS COUNTY— 
flv 
LAYTON DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
LOUISE A. SYMES, 
Plaintiff, NOTICE OF APPEAL 
vs. 
MERLIN DAVID SYMES, 
Defendant. 
Civil No. 974702275 
Judge Darwin C. Hansen 
Notice is hereby given that the Defendant/Appellant above named, hereby appeals to the Supren 
Court of the State of Utah from those certain judgment of the Second District Court in and for Dav 
County, Layton Department, State of Utah, dated and entered on February 19, 1999. 
DATED and SIGNED this /$ day of March, 1999. 
Steven C. Tycksen 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I am employed by the office of Steven C. Tycksen, and that I mailed a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing, postage pre-paid to the following: 
1 
2 
3 
4.. 
Emilee Bean 
5 || BEAN & SMEDLEY 
190 S. Fort Lane, Suite 2 
6 II Layton, UT 84041 
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Steven C. Tycksen (3300) 
Lone Peak Law Offices, P.C. 
Attorney for Defendant 
Post Office Box 480 
Draper, Utah 84020-0480 
Telephone (801) 572-2700 
Facsimile (801) 553-1618 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
LAYTON DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
LOUISE A. SYMES, 
Plaintiff, NOTICE OF FILING COST BOND 
vs. 
MERLIN DAVID SYMES, 
Defendant. 
Civil No. 974702275 
Judge Darwin C. Hansen 
Notice is hereby given that the Defendant/Appellant above named, has filed herewith a cost bond 
of $300.00 in conjunction with the Notice of Appeal filed concurrently herewith. 
DATED and SIGNED this 15 day of March, 1999 
SteveaO Tycksen 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
1 CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
2 I hereby certify that I am employed by the office of Steven C. Tycksen, and that I mailed a true 
3 and correct copy of the foregoing, postage pre-paid to the following: 
4 II Emilee Bean 
BEAN & SMEDLEY 
5|| 190 S. Fort Lane, Suite 2 
Layton, UT 84041 
6 ;; 
7 on this lw day orFebrtwwy, 1999. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY, STATE QRUTAH 
FiLED \H CLERKS u.\ u -
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LOUISE A. SYMES, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MERLIN DAVID SYMES, 
Defendant. 
PYT: — -
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
Case No. 974702275 | 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the original Notice of Appeal was 
sent to: 
Utah Supreme Court 
450 South State Street 
PO Box 140230 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84II4-0230 
Kris Lair/Joanne Pratt 
Second District Court 
Farmington, Utah 84025 
Dated this 18th day of March, 1999. 
£&?/ NgjAeputy O&erk 
